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The content of this thesis is two-fold. First, I present a detailed overview of the setup and 
conduction of monetary policy in China. I describe the most important participants, the goals 
and instruments, and discuss the concepts of independence and transparency in a Chinese 
setting. I show that conduction of monetary policy in China has come a long way from the 
Mao-era when the People’s Bank of China (PBC) operated as a department of the Ministry of 
Finance, and the central authorities managed all financial transaction over the state budget. 
However, in terms of independence the ties between the central bank, other ministries and the 
China Communist Party are still tight and the areas of responsibility are vaguely defined. In 
addition, several commercial market participants have close ties to the government and should 
also be considered as important for the conduction of monetary policy. In sum, I argue that, 
the PBC cannot be regarded an independent central bank. 
Furthermore, even though the mandate of monetary policy is given in the law on People’s 
Bank of China, it is not clear how this mandate is integrated in the every-day decision 
making. In this thesis, I argue that the PBC operates under a two-fold policy goal of price 
stability and economic growth in the short run, but that it lacks one long-run inflation target 
rate. Instead, the State Council sets targets for both the inflation rate and the economic growth 
annually. I argue that these targets must be regarded as maximum and minimum levels 
respectively. I also show that the PBC officially considers the monetary aggregate, M2, as the 
intermediate target of monetary policy.   
The second part of this thesis is an empirical analysis of the conduction of monetary policy in 
China. As a bridge between the two parts I present a recap on the theoretical background of 
the inflation bias as presented by Barro and Gordon (1983). Barro and Gordon (1983) and 
later literature show that a positive inflation bias could evolve in the economy as a 
consequence of the central bank’s wish to stabilize growth around a level that exceeds the 
natural level of growth. My empirical analysis describes the difficulties in measuring inflation 
in an emerging economy as the Chinese one. By the use of available data, I show that the 
Chinese households must me regarded increasingly rational when forming their inflation 
expectations. Moreover, I argue that it seems like the general public finds the PBC credible, 
and the inflation expectations seems to follow the development in the annual inflation targets 
defined by the State Council. Finally, I make use of both official statistics on the inflation rate 
VI 
 
and the market’s inflation expectations to search for a positive inflation bias in the Chinese 
economy. I show that the realized inflation in China has exceeded the inflation target for 
about 35 percent of the time since 1996. I argue that, even though my description of the 
conduction of monetary policy in China shows that many of the necessary conditions for 
inflation bias to evolve are fulfilled, this is a too little share of time to conclude that such 
inflation bias is present in the Chinese economy. Nonetheless, I show that the inflation rate 
has been highly volatile over the same period, both compared to inflation in other countries 
and to domestic economic growth. I argue that this could indicate that the PBC places a 
majority of the weight on output when conducting monetary policy.  
In this thesis, I also present possible steps forward for the conduction of monetary policy in 
China that could create a more stable inflation rate and avoid the future possibility for a 
positive inflation bias in the Chinese economy. Most importantly, I argue that replacing the 
constantly shifting inflation target by a medium- or long term constant inflation rate would 
make the Chinese monetary policy more predictable, and if communicated the right way 
increase the transparency of the conduction of monetary policy. The cost will be a somewhat 
higher volatility in output growth. On the other side, the gain will be a much more stable 
inflation rate in the long run, which in itself could lead to higher growth as it makes it easier 





This thesis is the result of my wish to combine two fields of interests and knowledge: 
Economics and China. The thesis also marks the end of a long educational journey and I now 
look forward to new opportunities and challenges in the time ahead. 
Several people deserve thanks for their contribution to this thesis and for making the process 
of writing it easier and more enjoyable.  
First and foremost, I am deeply grateful to my supervisor Nina Larsson Midthjell for her 
guidance, enthusiastic encouragement and detailed feedback throughout the writing process. 
Her countless hours spent on reading the thesis, and discussing it with me, have without doubt 
improved the final result.     
Furthermore, I wish to thank Ole André Kjennerud and Martin Sommerseth Jaer for all help 
gaining a better understanding of the Chinese economy and statistics. I also want to thank my 
brother Kristian Netland for reading through and commenting on an earlier draft. A warm 
thank also to Marianne Andersen for all the breaks, lunches and fun discussions during the 
last few months.     
Finally, and most importantly, I want to thank my beautiful wife Kristina, who has supported 
me and encouraged me during the process of writing this thesis. Without her, this thesis 
would have been impossible.  




Table of Content 
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1 
2 China’s Financial Sector: History and Participants............................................................ 4 
2.1 The first wave: Economic reforms .............................................................................. 4 
2.1.1 Creating the “Big Four” ....................................................................................... 5 
2.1.2 Introducing competition to the financial market .................................................. 5 
2.1.3 Introducing foreign banks to the financial market ............................................... 6 
2.1.4 Introducing additional sources for finance and credit .......................................... 6 
2.2 The second wave: Ownership reforms ........................................................................ 7 
2.2.1 Creating Asset Management Companies ............................................................. 8 
2.2.2 The Big Four go public ........................................................................................ 8 
2.3 Current state of the financial sector: A deep, but narrow sector ................................. 9 
2.3.1 A deep sector ........................................................................................................ 9 
2.3.2 A narrow sector dominated by large state-owned banks .................................... 10 
2.3.3 Financial regulation ............................................................................................ 12 
2.3.4 Problems with the regulatory system ................................................................. 13 
2.3.5 Financial stability and shadow banking ............................................................. 13 
2.4 The Central Bank – People’s Bank of China ............................................................. 15 
2.4.1 Organizational structure ..................................................................................... 15 
2.4.2 Current leadership .............................................................................................. 16 
2.4.3 The regional branches of the PBC ...................................................................... 17 
2.4.4 The monetary policy committee ......................................................................... 18 
2.5 Other participants in the Chinese monetary policy ................................................... 20 
2.5.1 The Party – China Communist Party .................................................................. 20 
2.5.2 The State – State Council ................................................................................... 22 
2.6 The hierarchy of China’s financial sector and monetary policy ................................ 23 
3 Monetary Policy in China ................................................................................................ 25 
3.1 Monetary policy targets ............................................................................................. 25 
3.1.1 Policy goals and final targets ............................................................................. 26 
3.1.2 Intermediate targets ............................................................................................ 30 
3.1.3 Operational targets ............................................................................................. 33 
3.2 Monetary policy instruments in China ...................................................................... 36 
IX 
 
3.2.1 Reserve requirements ratio ................................................................................. 36 
3.2.2 Open market operations ..................................................................................... 39 
3.2.3 Interest rates ....................................................................................................... 40 
3.2.4 Window guidance ............................................................................................... 43 
3.2.5 Capital controls .................................................................................................. 44 
3.2.6 Wage and price controls ..................................................................................... 44 
3.3 The (lack of) independence of People’s Bank of China ............................................ 46 
3.3.1 Goal independence ............................................................................................. 47 
3.3.2 Instrument independence .................................................................................... 47 
3.3.3 Personal independence ....................................................................................... 49 
3.3.4 Exchange rate independence .............................................................................. 50 
3.4 The (lack of) transparency of People’s Bank of China ............................................. 50 
3.4.1 Political transparency ......................................................................................... 51 
3.4.2 Economic transparency ...................................................................................... 52 
3.4.3 Policy transparency ............................................................................................ 53 
3.4.4 Procedural transparency ..................................................................................... 53 
3.4.5 Operational transparency .................................................................................... 53 
4 The Barro Gordon Model ................................................................................................. 55 
4.1 Model set-up .............................................................................................................. 55 
4.2 Optimal monetary policy under discretion ................................................................ 60 
4.2.1 Inflation expectations equals the inflation target ............................................... 61 
4.2.2 Rational expectations ......................................................................................... 63 
5 Chinese Monetary Policy – An Empirical Analysis......................................................... 66 
5.1 The Chinese inflation rate .......................................................................................... 66 
5.1.1 The Consumer price index ................................................................................. 67 
5.1.2 The GDP deflator ............................................................................................... 71 
5.1.3 Choice of inflation measure ............................................................................... 73 
5.2 Inflation expectations and central bank credibility in China ..................................... 74 
5.2.1 How rational are Chinese inflation expectations? .............................................. 74 
5.2.2 Credibility and inflation expectations ................................................................ 76 
5.3 Does China have an inflation bias? ........................................................................... 81 
5.4 Policy implications: How to create stable inflation in China and steps forward for 
monetary policy .................................................................................................................... 86 
X 
 
6 Concluding remarks ......................................................................................................... 89 
References ................................................................................................................................ 91 
Appendix .................................................................................................................................. 99 
A.1 Solutions to the inflation bias ........................................................................................ 99 
A.1.1 Commitment to a rule ............................................................................................. 99 
A.1.2 Delegating the conduction of monetary policy .................................................... 102 
A.1.3 Changing the inflation target ................................................................................ 103 








The conduction of monetary policy in China has come a long way from the Mao-era when the 
People’s Bank of China (PBC) operated as a department of the Ministry of Finance, and the 
central authorities managed all financial transaction over the state budget. In 1995, the Law of 
the People’s Republic of China on the PBC laid the foundation for Chinese monetary policy 
and granted the PBC the main responsibility (Bell and Feng, 2013). In practice the ties 
between the central bank, other ministries and the China Communist Party are tight and the 
responsibility borders are vague. In addition, several commercial market participants have 
close ties to the government and must also be considered as important for the conduction of 
monetary policy.  
More important than who conducts monetary policy, however, are why and how monetary 
policy is conducted. Although the mandate of the PBC is stated in the law, it is not clear how 
well this mandate is integrated in the every-day decision-making. In this thesis, I argue that 
the People’s Bank of China operates under a two-fold policy goal of price stability and 
economic growth in the short run, but that it lacks the long run inflation target that most other 
developed central banks, like the European Central Bank, Bank of England and Norges Bank, 
operate under. The central authorities, both the PBC and other institutions, have a series of 
instruments available to reach these policy goals. As I will show in this thesis, some of these 
instruments are quite different from what central banks in most OECD countries use when 
conducting monetary policy.  
The fundamental problem faced by any author or researcher who search for answers regarding 
Chinese monetary policy in general, and the PBC in particular, is the limited transparency 
surrounding the Chinese governmental system. Consequently, the literature on the field is 
somewhat limited. Bell and Feng (2013) discuss the growth of the PBC in an institutional 
framework and conclude that the increasing importance of the PBC reflects the mutual 
dependence between the PBC and the communist party. Conway et al (2010) and Laurens and 
Maino (2007) present possible future reforms of the conduction of monetary policy in China 
and argue that China should shift focus from a government controlled system to a fully 
market-based monetary policy. The literature on the broader concept of the Chinese financial 
sector is richer. Naughton (2007), Lardy (1998, 2000, 2012) and Walter and Howie (2011) all 
cover the transformation of the Chinese economy during the reform period and also discusses 
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the current state of the sector, but they do not take on the monetary policy in detail. IMF 
(2011) presents an objective view on the Chinese financial sector, and provide a series of 
possible future reforms. One of the more thorough analyses of Chinese monetary policy is 
probably Geiger (2010) who provides an overview of Chinese monetary policy with a 
discussion of targets, instruments and independence, and of whether monetary policy is 
efficient under the given mandate. He finds that the PBC has a good record of reaching the 
annual targets for inflation and economic growth over the period 1994-2008, and argues that 
there is a close link between the monetary aggregate (M2) and inflation. However, Geiger 
(2010) does not discuss the transparency and credibility of the PBC, and in my view fails to 
fully discuss the problems caused by the close ties between the central bank, the government 
and the ruling party. Furthermore, household’s inflation expectations, which are crucial for 
the efficiency of monetary policy, are almost let out from the analysis.1 In addition to 
presenting a detailed description of how monetary policy is conducted in China, this thesis 
contributes further to the literature by providing a thorough analysis of the degree of 
transparency, credibility and the central bank independence (all of crucial importance for the 
efficiency of monetary policy); by presenting a thorough empirical analysis of the importance 
of inflation expectations: and by discussing whether Chinese monetary policy is exposed to a 
positive inflation bias.  
The content of this thesis is two-fold. First, I present a detailed overview of the setup and 
conduction of monetary policy. I describe the most important participants, the goals and 
instruments and discuss the concepts of independence and transparency in a Chinese setting. 
Second, by the use of available data, I search for rational expectations and a possible positive 
inflation bias in the economy. Such positive inflation bias could be the consequence if the 
central bank tries to stabilize growth around a level that exceeds the natural level of growth. 
The two parts of the thesis are closely related to each other and the empirical analysis in part 
two will build on the knowledge and information presented in part one. As a bridge between 
the two parts I present a recap on the theoretical background of the inflation bias as presented 
by Barro and Gordon (1983). 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the recent history and most 
important participants of the Chinese financial sector, as well as the three most important 
                                                 
1 The importance of inflation expectations for monetary policy efficiency will be further discussed in section 4 
and 5 below.  
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decision-making authorities for the conduction of monetary policy in China: The People’s 
Bank of China, the State Council and the China Communist Party. In section 3, I dig deeper 
into the conduction of monetary policy in China and present a detailed description of the 
policy goals, targets and instruments of monetary policy. The section also questions the 
independence and transparency of the People’s Bank of China. Section 4 defines the inflation 
bias and presents the theoretical background of such possible inflation bias building on Barro 
and Gordon (1983) and Kydland and Prescott (1977). I further discuss the relevance of the 
model for the Chinese context. In section 5, I conduct an empirical analysis of the Chinese 
monetary policy. I discuss how choice of inflation measure matters for the outcome, and the 
rationality of the Chinese household when forming their inflation expectations. Next, I make 
use of two different measures of inflation expectations to analyze the credibility of the 
People’s Bank of China. Furthermore, I make use of available data on inflation and inflation 
expectations to search for an inflation bias. Finally, by combining the information and 
knowledge from sections 3 and 4 with the results in section 5, I present some policy 
implications and possible steps forward for the conduction of Chinese monetary policy. 
Section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
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2 China’s Financial Sector: History 
and Participants 
As in any other economy, the structure and functioning of the Chinese financial market is of 
high importance for the conduction of monetary policy. Naughton (2007) argues that the 
Chinese financial sector has been one of the most protected and overregulated industries in 
the country. On the surface the sector looks very much like any other developed economy’s 
financial sector with bank and non-bank institutions, domestic and foreign banks, private and 
state-owned banks, stock and bond markets, central bank and financial regulators. However, if 
you look under the surface, you will find a series of characteristics that distinguish the 
Chinese financial sector from any modern financial sector in the developed world. This 
section starts with an overview over what make these characteristics.2 Sections 2.1 and 2.2 
take on the development of the sector in the post-Mao period while section 2.3 summarizes 
the current state of the financial sector and present the most important market participants. 
One of the most important characteristics of the Chinese financial sector is the way monetary 
policy is conducted. In most modern economies the conducting of monetary policy is fully or 
partly entrusted to an independent central bank. In China, however, the picture is quite 
different, and several institutions, parties, and even individuals, play an important role of 
Chinese monetary policy. In section 2.4 and 2.5, I will consider the participants in Chinese 
monetary policy. The most important institution remains the central bank, but I will argue that 
other government ministries and especially the Communist Party also must be considered key 
participants. Finally, in section 2.6, I describe the hierarchy of the Chinese financial sector. 
2.1 The first wave: Economic reforms 
Under the Mao-era (1949-1976), China operated a mono-banking system where the People’s 
Bank of China (PBC) acted both as the central bank and as a commercial bank that accepted 
deposits and granted loans.3 The government and the Communist Party fully controlled the 
PBC and it was in fact organized as a department of the Ministry of Finance (MOF). Other 
banks, such as Bank of China (BOC) or China Construction Bank (CCB), were either sub-
                                                 
2 An in-depth-analysis of the Chinese financial sector is outside the scope of this thesis. Good references on the 
subject are IMF (2011), Lardy (1998, 2000), Naughton (2007) and Walter and Howie (2011). This section will 
draw on these references. 
3 A list of all abbreviations used in this thesis is presented in the appendix.  
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ordinated to the PBC or operated only as a tool of the MOF (Lardy 2000). On the commercial 
side, the PBC controlled over 80 percent of all deposits and was the source of 93 percent of 
all loans by financial institutions (Lardy, 1998). On the central bank side of its business, the 
PBC regulated the money supply, fixed interest rates, managed China’s holdings of foreign 
exchange and controlled and supervised all other financial institutions. In a centrally planned 
economy as this, the scope for financial intermediation is small and limited. Pricing and 
allocation of capital was determined by the government and the five-year plan, and not by the 
financial system (Huang et al, 2013a).  
The economic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s “…affected every aspect 
of life in China and left no institution untouched” (Saich, 2011, p.67). This is also true for the 
financial sector which has changed substantially since the reform and opening up started.  
2.1.1 Creating the “Big Four” 
One of the most important reforms initiated in the late 1970s was the abolishment of the 
monobanking system and a gradual reconstruction of financial institutions. In 1979, BOC and 
CCB were separated from the PBC and the MOF, and specialized in foreign exchange 
transactions and large investment projects respectively. The same year, the Agriculture Bank 
of China (ABC) was established to handle any agriculture-related commercial bank activities. 
In 1983, the transfers of all commercial activities from PBC was completed when the fourth 
large state-owned commercial bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), was 
established. The ICBC’s role was to handle all deposit and lending functions of the PBC, 
which now were designated as the central bank of China. ICBC immediately became the 
largest financial institution, as it overtook the vast branch network of the PBC (Lardy 2000). 
Together the ICBC, the BOC, the ABC and the CCB formed the “Big Four” that even today 
dominate the banking sector of China. 
2.1.2 Introducing competition to the financial market 
From the mid-1980s, the government allowed a gradually increase of competition in the 
banking sector. Lardy (1998) argues that this happened both by letting the Big Four operate 
outside their traditional scope of business, and by introducing new financial institutions, both 
bank- and non-bank institutions. National level banks, such as Bank of Communications 
(BOCOM) and the China Merchants Bank, were established in 1986 and 1987, both joint-
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stock commercial banks with the government as the main shareholder. In addition, a larger 
number of regional banks were introduced (both rural and urban), such as Merchants Bank 
and the Shanghai Pudong Development Bank. The first private bank, Minsheng Bank, was 
first established in 1995.  
In 1994, the government established three policy banks to secure lending to policy objectives 
and to ease the burden of lending to such objectives for the Big Four.4 The introduction of 
non-bank institutions, as trust and investment companies (TICs), should also help divide up 
investment and commercial banking activities (Geiger, 2010). In 1988, only a decade after 
reforms started, there were as many as 745 TICs operating in the Chinese economy (Lardy, 
1998). 
2.1.3 Introducing foreign banks to the financial market 
The introduction of foreign commercial banks has followed a gradual pattern, and only most 
recently have they been granted full access to the financial market. Prior to 1991, foreign 
banks were only allowed to conduct business in special economic zones, later new areas were 
opened up for foreign banks, starting with coastal and central cities. The initial scope of 
business for foreign banks was limited to foreign currency and export activities. After China’s 
entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 it became easier for foreign banks to 
conduct business in China. An immediate effect was that all foreign banks were allowed to 
operate foreign currency business to all clients, both domestic and foreign. Five years later, 
after the transition period ended, foreign banks were also allowed to conduct local currency 
business all over the country and by that complete the gradual introduction of foreign banks 
into the Chinese financial markets. By 2010, there were 130 foreign banks present in China 
(IMF, 2011). However, foreign banks’ share of total banking assets and liabilities remain 
marginal.5 
2.1.4 Introducing additional sources for finance and credit 
As the reform proceeded and the economy grew, the need for additional sources of finance 
and credit became clear. The large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) raised all the capital they 
                                                 
4 The three policy banks are China Development Bank, The Export-Import Bank and the Agriculture 
Development Bank. 
5 Only 2,25 percent of the commercial banking assets were hold by foreign banks in 2012 (CEIC Data). 
7 
 
needed from the large state-owned banks. The small- and medium-sized enterprises, on the 
other side, found it hard to raise capital. The hope was that a stock market would make 
financing for such firms easier. In 1990, two domestic stock exchanges were established in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen. In addition to providing an alternative source of capital, the 
government wanted to encourage restructuring of the large SOEs (Geiger, 2010). The stock 
markets grew rapidly, and the number of listed companies increased from 10 in 1990 to 2342 
in 2011 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2012). The quality, however, was, and still is, hurt by 
strict government control, limited transparency and limited availability for foreign investors. 
In 1981, the MOF started to issue treasury bonds. Gradually, different types of bonds have 
been introduced to the financial market including central bank bills, financial bonds issued by 
banks and non-bank financial institutions, corporate bonds issued mainly by large SOEs and 
inter-bank bonds. Despite this variety of types of bonds the corporate bond market has played, 
and still plays, a minor role in China’s financial sector. 
2.2 The second wave: Ownership reforms 
Another important reform for the financial sector was the changes made to the governing of 
the SOEs. In the pre-reform period these firms received funding directly over the 
government’s budget, and all profits were seized by the MOF. The large SOEs also 
functioned as a welfare system and provided “cradle-to-grave” care for its workers.6 Starting 
in the mid-1980s, most SOEs were no longer funded over the budget.  Thus, these firms 
started to use the financial markets, mainly the large state-owned banks, to fund investments. 
This means that funding of the SOEs shifted from the government directly to the state-owned 
banks. Many of these SOEs were outdated, inefficiently organized and the economic burden 
of providing welfare for its huge working force became gradually heavier. World Bank (1997) 
estimates show that as many as 50 percent of all SOEs incurred net losses in 1996. Further 
reforms were needed, and in 2003, the State Asset Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) was established to handle the ownership of SOEs. SASAC reports 
directly to the State Council and is today responsible for 117 centrally-owned large SOEs 
(excluding the state-owned banks).7  Naughton (2007) argues that SASAC has stepped up the 
focus of efficiency and profitability, and during the 2000s the SOEs budget constraints have 
                                                 
6 Workers employed by the SOEs was said to be provided an “iron rice bowl”. The SOEs provided health care, 
education, housing and food (see for example Halskov Hansen and Thøresen (2013)). 
7 See section 2.5 for a further presentation of the State Council. 
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become gradually harder, i.e. the enterprises themselves are accountable for their economic 
performance and debt.8 
2.2.1 Creating Asset Management Companies  
Even though the first commercial banks were established in the late 1970s, it was first in 1995 
that the Commercial Bank Law was passed by the National People’s Congress and by that 
giving a formal legislation for the commercial banks. Despite the increased competition, the 
introduction of policy banks and commercializing of the banking sector, the main role of the 
large banks remained feeding the large SOEs with capital according to the wishes of the 
government (Saich, 2011). The inefficiency of these SOEs then gave rise to a large portfolio 
of non-performing loans (NPLs) for the large state-owned banks. In the late 1990s the NPL-
ratio exceeded 40 percent of the total outstanding loans (Naughton, 2007). The Asian 
financial crisis in 1997-1998 further illustrated the need for additional reform to the bank 
sector and especially to the Big Four. In 1999, four Asset Management Companies (AMC) 
were established, one for each of the four large state-owned banks. In 2000, almost all of the 
non-performing loans were transferred from the Big Four to the newly established AMCs. 
The banks were now relieved from the troubling loans. However the root of the problem 
remained and by 2003 the NPL-ratio of the Big Four was still above 20 percent of the total 
outstanding loans (Naughton, 2007). 
2.2.2 The Big Four go public 
The government now decided that an ownership reform of the banks was needed and started 
to prepare the banks for public listing on the international stock market. During 2004-2005, 
the Bank of China (BOC), the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and the 
China Construction Bank (CCB) all received new capital from the government and transferred 
more non-performing loans (NPLs) to the AMCs. In the autumn of 2005, CCB raised more 
than 70 billion RMB on its initial public offering (Walter and Howie, 2011).9 The other banks 
followed, first by the BOC, then the ICBC. Finally, in 2010, the Agricultural Bank of China 
(ABC) was the last of the Big Four to get listed on the stock market. 
                                                 
8 The number of SOEs under SASAC’s control has declined from 196 in 2003 to the current 117. In addition, 
local governments have established their own SASACs with responsibility for locally-owned state enterprises. 
9 The renminbi (RMB) is the official currency in People’ Republic of China. End of September 2013 the 
exchange rate RMB to USD was 6.148 (CEIC Data) 
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2.3 Current state of the financial sector: A deep, but 
narrow sector 
Naughton (2007) describes the current financial sector of China as “deep, but narrow”. 
Financial depth is measured by the ratio of financial assets to gross domestic product (GDP), 
and financial width is measured by the variety of financial instruments and institutions. I 
argue that Naughton’s characteristic of the financial sector still remains valid. 
2.3.1 A deep sector 
The gradually increasing depth of the Chinese financial sector is illustrated by figure 1 below. 
M2, defined as currency in circulation plus any savings and demand deposits, increased 
substantially from only 36,8 percent of GDP at the start of the reform period,  to 187 percent 
in 2012. Naughton (2007) argues that the most important component of this dramatically 
increase in M2 was household deposits, and figure 1 also illustrates the similar rapid increase 
in domestic credit provided by the banking sector. Notice that the trend started to level out, 
and even decline, in the beginning of the 2000s, but following the outbreak of the global 
financial crisis in 2008, both M2 and domestic credit started to increase again as a direct 





















Figure 1: Domestic credit provided by banking sector and M2 
as percent of GDP 
Domestic credit provided by the banking sector
M2
Source: World Bank Data 
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2.3.2 A narrow sector dominated by large state-owned banks 
Despite the many attempts of increasing competition and introducing new financial sources in 
the reform period, the financial sector as a whole remains narrow in the sense that it heavily 
relies on the large banks.  
The limited width of the Chinese financial sector is two-sided: First, the financial sector as a 
whole suffers by lack of diversification. Walter and Howie (2011) states: “In China the banks 
are the financial system” (p.27). In 2010, more than 80 percent of all corporate capital raised 
came from the banking sector, see figure 2. 
 
 
Recently, more of the total capital is raised outside of the banking sector, in the shadow 
market, i.e. by informal lending or off-balance sheet lending. I will return to this under the 
discussion of financial stability in section 2.3.5. For now, it is important to notice that also the 
funding raised in the shadow market indirectly comes from the banking sector.  
The second side of the narrow financial sector concerns the banking sector itself. As shown in 
figure 3, the banking sector is dominated by a few large participants. Even though the market 
















Figure 2: Corporate capital raised 1993-2010 
New Bank Loan Issued Corporate Bond Issued Equity Capital Raised
Source: People’s Bank of China, Walter and Howie (2011, Figure 1.8, p.16) 
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dominate the banking sector.10 More than half of all commercial bank assets are held by the 
large state-owned banks.11 Even if assets held by non-commercial banks, credit cooperatives 
and non-bank financial institutions are included, the large state-owned banks hold more than 
45 percent of all assets. 
 
 
Measured by market capitalization and assets, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC) is the largest of the Chinese banks. In 2012, ICBC alone held more than 16 percent of 
all commercial banking assets (CEIC Data). Data on Chinese state-owned enterprises’ market 
capitalization are, however, somewhat misleading, given that only a fraction of the total 
shares are tradable (Walter and Howie, 2011). Nonetheless, no matter how one measures the 
size, Chinese banks are massive institutions. In 2012, the banking sector employed about 3.3 
million workers. Almost half were employed by the five large state-owned banks (CEIC 
Data). In their “Global 2000”-list over the largest public companies considering sales, profits 
and assets in addition to market value, Forbes places all of the Big Four among the world’s 
top eleven.12 Their massive size and their important role in the economy indicate that these 
large banks are protected by an implicit guarantee. It is doubtful that the government would 
                                                 
10 The large state-owned commercial banks consist of the Big Four and the Bank of Communication (BOCOM). 
11 In 2012, 57 percent of all commercial banking assets were held by the large state-owned banks (CEIC Data). 






























Figure 3: Composition and evolution of the commercial banking 
sector 
Large state-owned commercial banks Joint-stock commercial banks
City commercial banks Rural commercial banks
Foreign banks Total commercial bank assets (RHS)
Source: CEIC Data 
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let these banks fail, and this guarantee could of course give root to some serious moral hazard 
problems, where banks take on too high risk. 
2.3.3 Financial regulation 
Under the Maoist-era and early years of reform, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) had all 
regulatory and supervisory responsibilities in the financial sector. As the financial sector 
improved, and PBC developed into a more traditional central bank, also the supervision tasks 
were transferred to other institutions. Today, the regulatory and supervision system consists of 
several institutions.13  China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) was established as 
early as in 1992 as a direct consequence of the establishment of the domestic stock market. 
China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) was established in 1998. And finally, in 
2003, the banking supervision tasks were transferred from PBC to the newly established 
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), the same year as the Law on Banking 
Regulation and Supervision was implemented.  
CSRC shall, among other duties, create policies, laws and regulations for the securities and 
future markets, and administer and supervise the issuance, listing, trading, custody and 
settlement of stocks and bonds of different types (CSRC, 2013a). Since the establishment in 
1992, CSRC has worked for improving the quality of the domestic stock markets and the 
quality of the listed companies. Even though there are still several shortcomings of the stock 
market, there is no doubt that the work of CSRC has had an impact.  CIRC formulates 
policies, strategies and plans, draft laws and regulations for the insurance industry (CIRC, 
2013). CIRC has focused on the solvency of insurance companies. Given the important role 
that banks play in the Chinese economy, CBRC’s role cannot be emphasized enough. CBRC 
supervises all types of banks: commercial, policy and foreign funded. CBRC’s main 
objectives are to provide fair competition and promote the safety and soundness of the 
banking sector (CBRC, 2012). By setting requirements on capital adequacy, loan provision 
and risk control CBRC tries to control the stability of the sector. 
 
                                                 
13 Some of them have a more unofficial supervision role, such as the MOF, the PBC and the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). I will return to these in section 3 below. In this section I 
consider the three distinct institutions with responsibility for securities, insurance and banking regulation. 
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2.3.4 Problems with the regulatory system 
There are several good reasons not to have one super-regulatory institution in charge of all 
parts of the financial sector and instead organize the regulatory system as it is done in China. 
The problem for the Chinese economy, however, is that the borders between the different 
institutions are vague and in many cases the institutions have overlapping responsibilities. 
The IMF concludes that: “The legal and regulatory framework for banking has been brought 
closer in line with international standards, but gaps remain” (IMF, 2011, p. 41). Officially, 
the three national institutions (the MOF, the NDRC and the PBC), and the three sector 
institutions (the CBRC, the CSRC and the CIRC) are all at ministerial level and report 
directly to the State Council. In this sense they are all equally strong. However, Geiger (2010) 
argues that “the actual status of an organization within institutional framework of China 
depends to a large degree on the personal power and the personal ranking of its leaders in 
the system” (p.50). 
2.3.5 Financial stability and shadow banking 
IMF (2011) concludes that the overall stability of the Chinese financial sector is robust, but 
mentions some potential risk for the near-term. IMF (2011) further describes several 
characteristics of the macroeconomic and institutional environment that contribute to a build-
up of vulnerabilities. Low cost of capital, underdeveloped capital markets, incomplete interest 
rate deregulation, limited exchange rate flexibility, high reliance of credit growth and 
government involvement in the financial sector are among the characteristics included. As 
later sections in this thesis will show, some of these characteristics are directly linked up to 
the way China conducts monetary policy. 
One of the potential risk factors that the financial sector faces is increased dependence on 
shadow banking. Shadow banking is not a problem in itself and, considering the narrow 
financial market in China, it’s rather a good thing that more financing takes place outside of 
the banking sector.14 The problem of this shadow banking is the close link to the regular 
banking sector. Often, large SOEs obtain loans from the Big Four at low interest rates and 
then lend the funds to small- and medium sized enterprises that are unable to obtain loans 
directly from the banking sector. Trust companies also rely on bank funding. And perhaps 
most importantly: the large state-owned banks provide Wealth Management Products to 
                                                 
14 Naturally, the underground unregulated part of shadow banking is problematic. 
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investors and trust companies, which are held off banks’ balance sheets. Figure 4 illustrates 
the rapid increase of off-balance lending following the global financial crisis. 
 
 
There are several reasons for the rapid increase in shadow banking and there are at least two 
links to the way China conducts monetary policy. First, the stimulus package following the 
financial crisis led to a rapid increase in lending (see figure 1 and figure 4). To limit this 
growth in loans, the authorities increased the banks’ required reserves ratios several times 
during 2010 and 2011. Small- and medium sized firms found it hard to raise capital from the 
large state-owned banks, and then looked for other sources in the informal market. Second, 
PBC operates a strict control on interest rates and then puts an upper bound on the deposit 
rates that the bank may offer. Figure 5 shows that the real one-year interest rate on deposits 
was negative during at least two periods, 2006-2008 and 2009-2010. When the real interest 
rate is negative, the deposits placed in the banks yield a loss, because the inflation, the overall 
price increase in the economy, exceeds the interest earned on the deposits. One may say that 
the depositors pay a tax on their deposits. These factors led investors, enterprises and wealthy 
















Figure 4: Flow of Total Social Financing* and Bank loans  
Bank Loans Total Social FinancingSource: CEIC Data 
* Total Social Financing (TSF) consists of trust and entrust loans, bank acceptance loans, corporate bond financing and 




2.4 The Central Bank – People’s Bank of China 
The People’s Bank of China (PBC) was founded in 1948. A monobanking system was 
established with the PBC as the only real bank. The PBC’s function was to allocate capital 
and funds according to the state plan and annual budgets (Yabuki and Harner, 1999). As 
shown in section 2.1, the PBC was gradually transformed into a modern central bank. 
However, it was not until 1995 that The Law of the People’s Republic of China on the 
People’s Bank of China (hereafter just “the law on PBC”) was approved by the National 
People’s Congress (NPC). The law was amended in 2003 when China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC) was established and the PBC no longer was the main regulator of the 
commercial banks. The law on PBC strictly regulates the targets, instruments and 
organizational structure of the PBC, as well as currency and supervision issues. 
2.4.1 Organizational structure 
The head office of the PBC is located in Beijing and consists of 18 departments and bureaus, 
however, only one third of these departments are directly relevant to monetary policy 
decisions. Geiger (2010) argues that the most important departments for monetary policy are 

















Figure 5: One-year real deposit rate 
One-year real deposit rate
Source: World Bank Data 
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Financial Stability Bureau (FSB), the State Treasury Bureau, the International Department 
and the Research Bureau. Of these, the MPD is the single most important. The MPD is 
“Responsible for setting the intermediate target of monetary policy and coordinating efforts 
to achieve the target” (PBC, 2009). The MPD is also responsible for proposing monetary 
policy instruments and the implementation of policies. Of the other departments, the two 
concerning financial stability, the FMD and the FSB, are of increasing importance.  
In addition to the 18 departments and bureaus, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
(SAFE) “partly” lies under the PBC. I write “partly” because the SAFE also functions as an 
separate institution in itself, directly under the State Council. The fact that the SAFE both 
reports directly to State Council and functions as a PBC subordinate probably reflects the 
increasing importance of the SAFE and the foreign exchange reserves. Still, the administrator 
of the SAFE is to be recruited from within the current leadership group of the PBC. The 
SAFE is responsible for drafting and implementing laws and regulations of foreign exchange 
activities, and managing the foreign exchange reserves (SAFE, 2013). 
2.4.2 Current leadership 
The law on PBC states that PBC shall have a governor nominated by the premier, decided by 
the NPC and appointed by the president (PBC, 2003a). Together with a set of deputy 
governors and assistant governors, the governor is the final authority of all matters regarding 
the PBC (Geiger, 2010), i.e deputy governors, departments, bureaus, branches and 
committees only have an advisory and monitoring role; all final decisions (at least decisions 
of some importance) within the PBC must be approved by the governor.  
Currently, the leadership of the PBC consists of one governor, five deputy governors, two 
assistant governors and one commissioner of discipline inspection. Table 1 presents the 
current group of leaders and their background. As part of the Chinese leadership transition, 
Zhou Xiaochuan was reappointed as governor of the PBC by the NPC, in March 2013, even 
though he already had reached the ten-year limit for official positions in the Chinese 
government.15 Deputy Governor Yi Gang is seen as a likely successor the day Governor Zhou 
steps down (Li, 2010).  
                                                 
15 Walter and Howie (2011) describe Zhou as one of the architects behind the recapitalization and restructuring 
of the commercial banks in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
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There is a tradition to recruit governors and deputy governors from within the PBC 
departments and subordinates.16 Bell and Feng (2013) argue that the increasing importance of 
the PBC reflects a clear strategy of recruiting highly skilled economists and financial 
expertise. As shown in table 1, the academic level of the leadership is high. However, only 
Deputy Governor Yi has educational background from outside of China.17 




Ph.D. in Economic Systems Engineering, Tsinghua University, 
Beijing. Chairman CSRC. President CCB. Deputy Governor 
PBC. Administrator, SAFE. 
Deputy Governor 
Hu Xiaolian (F) 
Master’s degree in Economics. Alternate member of the CCP 




Master’s degree in Management Engineering. Assistant Governor, 
PBC. Director-General, Various Departments PBC. 
Deputy Governor and 
Administrator of SAFE 
Yi Gang 
Ph.D. in Economics, University of Illinois, USA. Professor 
Beijing University. Assistant Professor Indiana University, USA. 













Ph.D. in Economics. Member of CCP Central Committee. 
Commissioner of Discipline Inspection and Assistant Chairman, 
CBRC. Director-General Banking Supervision Department, PBC. 
Assistant Governor 
Guo Qingping 
Bachelor’s degree Economics. President, Tianjin Branch of PBC. 
Director-General, Various Departments PBC. 
Assistant Governor 
Jin Qi 
Director-General at various Departments, PBC. 
Source: People’s Bank of China 
2.4.3 The regional branches of the PBC 
In 1998, nine trans-provincial branches of the PBC were established and replaced the 
previously 31 provincial branches. The branches, according to the law, are responsible for 
maintaining financial stability and handling “relevant business operations” (PBC, 2003a, 
Article 13) in their respective regions. The actual importance and influence of the branches 
                                                 
16 Deputy Governor Pan of the current leadership is the only one recruited from outside of the PBC system. 
17 In addition, Deputy Governor Pan has a short stay at University of Cambridge, but his PhD degree is from 
Renmin University in Beijing. 
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are unclear. When established, the branches played an important role in supervising and 
regulating the important bank sector. However, when these responsibilities were transferred to 
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in 2003, the branches lost much of its 
influence.18 The establishment of regional branches instead of provincial branches must be 
seen as an attempt to increase the PBC’s independence and autonomy. With provincial 
branches the local governments could to some extent influence the conduction of monetary 
policy directly. By creating larger branches, the authorities removed this direct link between 
the provincial governments and the PBC and consequently increased the PBC’s 
independence. This is important because the local government traditionally have placed a 
larger focus in economic growth than the central government (Huang et al, 2013a).  
In 2005 a second head office was established in Shanghai, a move to better the PBC 
information and access to the increasingly important financial markets in Shanghai. Bell and 
Feng (2013) argues that the setup of a second head office was: “A clear attempt to copy the 
institutional pattern of the Federal Reserve Bank in New York…” (p. 145). 
2.4.4 The monetary policy committee 
According to The law on PBC, the PBC shall establish and lead a Monetary Policy 
Committee (MPC), however, unlike many other MPCs and executive boards around the 
world, the MPC of China has only an advisory role (see PBC, 2003b and Patra and 
Samantaraya, 2007).19 Table 2 shows the current members of the MPC and their positions 
outside the committee. The Committee meets once per quarter and (occasionally) presents 
short meeting records on the PBC webpage after the meeting. It is clear from table 2 that there 
is an uneven distribution between internal and external members. Only four out of fifteen 
members are internal from the PBC. The use of external members is common in MPCs 
around the world. In Norway the MPC consists of 2 internal and 5 external members. There 
are several arguments why a MPC should include external members. The most important are 
to avoid group-thinking and bringing in fresh arguments from outside the central bank 
(Qvigstad et al, 2013 and Blinder, 2008). However, if the external members have self-interest 
in the way monetary policy is conducted it could reduce the credibility of the central bank. 
                                                 
18 PBC also operates more than 300 municipal sub-branches, 1809 county-level sub-branches and five overseas 
representative offices. 
19 Article 12 states: “The People’s Bank of China shall establish a monetary policy committee, whose functions, 
composition and working procedures shall be prescribed by the State Council and reported to Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress for the record” (PBC, 2003a). 
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Consequently, in most MPCs the external members are restricted from participating in other 
financial activities, political activity and government service outside the central bank (Patra 
and Samantaraya, 2007). In contrast, table 2 shows that several of the external members of the 
Chinese MPC stem from other institutions and ministries that have self-interest in monetary 
policy decisions. Most remarkable is it that the commercial banks have their own 
representative in the MPC since the position as president in China Association of Banks 
(CAB) is usually held by one of the chairmen in the “Big Four”. That these banks are 
included in the conduction of monetary policy through a representative in the MPC, reflect 
their position in the Chinese economy. Other external members could be considered 
politicians, such as the two Vice-Ministers Zhu and Li, and Deputy Secretary-General You, 
which represent institutions and ministries that may have other targets and goals than the 
PBC. If, for example, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) puts more 
weight on economic growth than PBC, their representative could advocate a more expansive 
monetary policy than a non-politician representative would have done. As I show in later 
sections, this is one of the main arguments for why the conduction of monetary policy should 
be handed over to an independent central bank. 
Table 2: Members of the monetary policy committee in the PBC 
Internal members External member 
Name Position Name Position 
Zhou Xiaochuan Governor PBC  You Quan* Deputy Secretary-General 
State Council 
Yi Gang  Deputy Governor PBC 
and administrator of 
SAFE 
Zhu Zhixin Vice-Minister NDRC 
Hu Xiaolian Deputy Governor PBC Li Yong Vice-Minister MOF 
Du Jinfu* Deputy Governor PBC Ma Jiantang Commissioner NBSC 
  Jiang 
Jianqing 
President China Association 
of Banks and Chairman ICBC 
  Shang Fulin Chairman CBRC 
  Xiao Gang Chairman CSRC 
  Xiang Junbo Chairman CIRC 
  Qian Yingyi Professor Tsinghua 
   Chen Yulu Professor Renmin University 
  Song 
Guoqing 
Professor Beijing University 
Source: People’s Bank of China and Caixin (2013)  
* Du Jinfu and You Quan left the positions in the PBC and the State Council in conjunction with the leadership 
transition March 2013, according to the law on PBC they should then be replaced in the MPC. Nonetheless, as 
far as to my knowledge, they have in October 2013 not been replaced. 
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The law on PBC states that the MPC “shall play an important role in the State macro-control 
and the formulation and adjustment of monetary policies” (PBC, 2003a), however, how to 
interpret “an important role” is unclear. As mentioned above, the MPC only has an advisory 
role. Patra and Samantaraya (2007) create an index for MPC empowerment and place the 
Chinese MPC in the lower scale.20  
Nonetheless, given the high positions of the members and the important institutions 
represented in the MPC, it is my opinion that one should not underestimate the influence of 
the MPC. 
2.5 Other participants in the Chinese monetary 
policy 
For China it is important to distinguish between theoretical and de facto power. In theory, the 
National People’s Congress (NPC) is the highest organ of state power (Saich, 2011) and the 
parliament of China. However, the NPC meets only once a year and has, in reality, limited 
influence.21 All major decisions and appointments are made by the communist party. In this 
section, I will distinguish between the state and the party (even though the borders between 
them in most cases are quite vague) and shortly summarize their influence over Chinese 
monetary policy. As will be evident, both the party and the state have direct power and 
influence over the conduction of monetary policy, not only by setting goals and targets, but 
also through decision making and implementation of monetary policy. 
2.5.1 The Party – China Communist Party 
Even though the constitution may say otherwise or the setup of institutions looks much like 
any other modern country, one should not be in doubt: The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
holds the real power in China. Li (2010) puts it in clear words: “…power in the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) ultimately resides not in the government, but in the ruling CCP—not 
in the State Council, but in the Politburo and especially its Standing Committee” (Li, 2010, 
                                                 
20 The index considers ten attributes of MPC including legal mandate, absence of government and decision 
making roles. The index goes from 0 to 10, where 10 is the highest empowerment, and China get a resulting 
index of 3. As a comparison the Norges Bank receive 6, the European Central Bank 7, and Bank of England 9 
(Patra and Samantaraya, 2007). 




p.2). Although there are other political parties in the Chinese system, it is only the CCP that 
matters; the party had more than 83 million members in 2011 (Halskov Hansen and Thøresen, 
2013). The basic organizational principle of the CCP is a hierarchical organization formed as 
a pyramid with the real power consolidated within a small group of individuals. In theory, the 
top of the pyramid is the National Party Congress and its Central Committee.22 In practice, 
however, the real power lies with the Politburo of the Central Committee and, most 
importantly, the Standing Committee of the Politburo. 
Today, the Standing Committee of the Politburo (herafter just “Standing Committee”) 
consists of seven members who are the de facto leaders of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), no matter what other position they may hold. The members also have an internal 
ranking within the Standing Committee, where Xi Jinping is number one. He is General 
Secretary of the CCP Central Committee (leader of the party), President of the PRC (leader of 
the state) and Chairman of the CCP Military Commission (leader of the military). All 
members have their own portfolio with certain responsibilities such as economy, corruption 
and propaganda. Of the current members, Wang Qishan is the most skilled economist with 
background from the People’s Bank of China (PBC) and the China Construction Bank (CCB). 
The actual working of the Standing Committee is somewhat unclear; they meet frequently and 
the debates are said to be unrestrained (Saich, 2011). All major decisions concerning 
monetary policy, the financial sector and the economy in general must be approved by the 
Standing Committee. 
Within the party system there are also more informal bodies and groups, which main role is to 
advise the Politburo and its Standing Committee. One of these is the Central Group for 
Finance and Economics (CGFE), which, not surprisingly, covers economic issues. There is a 
large degree of overlapping members between the Standing Committee, the State Council and 
the CGFE (Geiger, 2010). The CGFE is normally headed by one of the members in the 
Standing Committee and most commonly the Premier. 
The CCP’s power over the Chinese economy is not only a top-down concept; the CCP is 
present at every level of decision making; regional, provincial, companies etc. Article 19 of 
the Company Law of PRC states: 
                                                 
22 The National Party Congress meets once every fifth year with more than 2000 delegates from all over the 
country. Formally the congress elects members to the Central Committee, in reality they are just approved by the 
Congress and elected by the party leaders. 
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“An organization of the Chinese Communist Party shall, according to the Charter of the 
Chinese Communist Party, be established in the company to carry out activities of the 
Chinese Communist Party. And the company shall provide necessary conditions for the 
activities of the Chinese Communist Party.” (Central People’s Government of the People’s 
Republic of China, 2005) 
All major banks have a party committee, usually headed by the chairman of the bank, this 
shall secure that all activities by the bank are in accordance with the party’s policy. All senior 
bankers are appointed directly by the party. All ministries, under the State Council also have a 
party committee. In addition to being the governor of the PBC, Zhou Xiaochuan also holds 
the title: Secretary of CCP Party Committee of PBC. 
2.5.2 The State – State Council 
The State Council, in theory appointed by the NPC (in reality appointed directly by the party), 
is the highest executive organ of state administration and in practice the government of China 
(Saich, 2011). The State Council is a massive and complex bureaucratic institution with 
various ministries, commissions, bureaus, institutions and organizations at several layers.23 
The first layer is the Standing or Executive Committee. It consists of the premier, four vice 
premiers and five state councilors, and the committee normally holds meetings once every 
week. Each of the vice-premiers and state councilors oversees certain areas of the 
administration where of one handles economic and monetary issues. 
The second layer of the State Council is the ministry-level. Currently, there are 25 ministries 
and commissions at this level, which of several have a direct relevance for conduction of 
monetary policy, such as the PBC, the NDRC, and the MOF, and to some extent also the 
National Audit Office. The head of all ministries and commissions are entitled to meet at the 
full meeting of the State Council, which meets once every six month. The MOF’s primary 
role is to handle fiscal policy, provide the annual national budget, issue bonds, and, together 
with other institutions, handle the foreign exchange reserves. Traditionally, and still today, the 
MOF has a close link and relationship to the large commercial banks. The MOF owns China 
Investment Corporation (CIC), which again holds Central Huijin Investment Ltd. as a fully-
                                                 
23 In total more than 60 ministries, institutions, organizations and bureaus lie directly under the State Council and 
report directly to the standing committee with various importance. Among these, we find the CBRC, the CIRC 
and the CSRC, as well as the large State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). 
These institutions and organizations report directly to the Executive Committee and then officially hold the same 




owned subsidiary.24 Central Huijin holds the majority of the governments share in the large 
Chinese banks.25 In addition to be the indirect owner of the banks, the MOF also plays a role 
in supervising and regulating the financial sector, illustrating the mixture and overlapping 
roles and responsibilities in the Chinese system. 
Another part of the supervision system is the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC), which concentrates on the securities market. The NDRC is one of the most powerful 
ministries under the State Council. Its responsibilities include formulating and implementing 
medium- and long term development plans and monitor current macroeconomic trends. There 
is no doubt that the NDRC plays an important role in the conduction of Monetary Policy as its 
“main functions” are to “… participate in the formulation of fiscal, monetary and land 
policies, and formulate and implement price policies” (NDRC, 2013). Under the NDRC is 
also the Department of Price, which is responsible for changing and setting prices under 
government control. Bell and Feng (2013) argue that the NDRC care more about growth than 
inflation.26 
2.6 The hierarchy of China’s financial sector and 
monetary policy 
To sum up my discussion of participants in the Chinese financial sector and conduction of 
monetary policy, figure 6 below intends to illustrate the hierarchy of the sector. There are 
many overlapping responsibilities and roles, and in many cases the actual power of an 
institution is defined by the personal power of the leader (and the corresponding personal 
political ranking), rather than the ranking of the institution per se. It is therefore difficult to 
illustrate and describe the actual hierarchy of the financial sector. It is even harder to describe 
the decision making process of monetary policy. Nonetheless, I will try to sketch the decision 
process for issues of some importance. The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meets 
quarterly to discuss and suggest possible actions. The PBC leads this committee and is 
represented with four members, but also other high ranked institutions and market actors are 
                                                 
24 CIC reports directly to the State Council, but was funded by the MOF when established in 2007. The close 
relationship was last illustrated when the previous chairman of CIC, Lou Jiwei, was appointed as the new 
Minister of Finance in March 2013. 
25 In December 2012, Central Huijin controls 67,72 percent of BOC’s, 57,21 percent of CCB’s, 47,63 percent of 
CDB’s, 40,21 percent of ABC’s and 35,46 percent of ICBC’s of the tradable shares. 




present. Then, the leaders of the PBC meet and decide upon what policy recommendations 
they will send over to the State Council. The Executive Committee of the State Council then 
meets and makes the final decision, based upon the PBC’s recommendations and the MPC’s 
suggestions. In cases of high importance the State Council could seek advice with the 
Standing Committee of the Politburo, or be instructed directly. Finally, the decision is sent 
back to the PBC (or the relevant institution), which will implement the decision. It seems 
clear that the PBC plays an important and central role, and Bell and Feng (2013) state that 
“Monetary policy remains more or less an exclusive turf of the PBC…” (p.53). I agree that 
this seems to be the case in many decisions, and the Executive Committee of the State 
Council will routinely approve all the minor decision recommendations that the PBC sends 
over. However, some parts of the monetary policy decisions are of so high importance, and 
could ultimately threaten the social stability, hence it seems likely that these issues are 
discussed all the way to the top of the CCP, and that the State Council and the PBC will get 
direct instructions from the Standing Committee of the Politburo. 
Figure 6: The hierarchy of China's financial sector 
 
 
The State Council 
People's Bank of China, Ministry of 
Finance and National Development 
and Reform Commission 
The three Regulators: CBRC, CSRC, CIRC 
The large state-owned banks: ICBC, CCB, ABC and BOC 
The financial market: Banks and non-bank instituions 
The Standing 
Committee of The 
Politburo of CCP 
Central Committee 
 
Sources: Author’s own illustration based on Bell and Feng (2013), Geiger (2010), IMF 
(2011), Walter and Howie (2011), Huang et.al (2013) and own research. 
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3 Monetary Policy in China 
In this section, I will discuss the implementation of monetary policy in China. I have divided 
the section into four parts, covering the important concepts of targets, instruments, 
independency and transparency. The sections will provide general definitions of the concepts, 
and make use of these definitions when considering the characteristics of Chinese monetary 
policy. 
3.1 Monetary policy targets 
When discussing monetary policy implementation, Walsh (2010) carefully distinguishes 
between operating targets, intermediate targets and policy goals. The policy goals represent 
the ultimate goal of monetary policy, which Bofinger (2001) argues should be to maximize 
the welfare of the population. Typically these ultimate goals are more well-defined such as 
price stability, maximum employment or economic growth. These goals lay the foundation for 
all monetary policy, indicated by the first box in figure 7 below. In the following, I will 
distinguish between policy goals and what I call final targets, where the latter are variables 
that secure that the policy goals are reached, i.e. if price stability is the policy goal, the final 
target will be an inflation level that are consistent with price stability.27 The instruments of 
monetary policy are what the central bank (or the responsible authority) controls directly.28 
These instruments are then used in such way that the operational targets are achieved, where 
the operational targets are defined as a pre-determined economic variable that the central bank 
can control with a short time lag. Furthermore, there is often a considerable time lag between 
the operational targets and the final targets, hence the need for intermediate targets, which 
must be closely related to both operational- and final targets. The intermediate targets then 
provide the central bank with information about economic development that affects the 
ultimate variables and final targets. This section will, by using the different definitions of 
monetary policy targets, consider the targets for monetary policy in China. 
 
                                                 
27 The terms final targets, ultimate goals and policy goals are all frequently used in the literature and there is no 
clear cut between the terms. However, policy goals and ultimate goals are often referred to as more vague goals 
such as maintaining the value of the currency or maximize employment, while final targets are more explicit 
goals such as an inflation rate or growth rate. 








3.1.1 Policy goals and final targets 
The policy goal of the Chinese monetary policy is formally stated in Article 3 in the law on 
PBC: “The aim of monetary policies shall be to maintain the stability of the value of the 
currency and thereby promote economic growth” (PBC, 2003a). The interpretation of this 
article, however, is a bit problematic, as there is disagreement on how to interpret the phrase: 
“maintain the stability of the value of the currency”. One could easily argue that it means 
controlling the exchange rate, and this could then explain why the currency has been so 
stable, and constantly undervalued, the last two decades. On the other hand, one could also 
argue that it means controlling the purchasing power of the population and then controlling 
the stability of domestic prices, i.e. price stability. If there is a rapid domestic price increase, 
without a corresponding wage increase, the real value of money will fall.  I will follow the 
last interpretation, which has become the common practice (see for example Geiger, 2010 and 
Bell and Feng, 2013).29 I further interpret Article 3 such that the policy goal of the monetary 
policy in China is two-fold: first, ensure price stability and second, as a consequence, promote 
economic growth. Such flexible inflation targeting is similar to  the conduction of monetary 
policy in many other central banks, for example the Bank of England (BoE) where the 
monetary policy objective is to: “… deliver price stability – low inflation – and, subject to 
that, to support the Government’s economic objectives including those for growth and 
employment” (BoE, 2013).30 The term flexible inflation targeting means that the central bank 
puts weight on both inflation and other targets such as unemployment and growth. The 
majority weight is typically placed on price stability. With flexible inflation targeting the 
central bank is willing to trade away some price stability against growth and employment 
                                                 
29 In box 3.1 I further elaborate on the role of the exchange rate as a target for monetary policy in China. 
30 Other central banks that practice flexible inflation targeting are e.g. the Norges Bank, the Federal Reserve and 
the Sveriges Riksbank.  
Policy goals Instruments Operational targets 
Intermediate 
targets Final targets 
Figure 7: The sequential line of monetary policy implementation in practice 
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stability in the short term (Galí, 2008).  It seems like PBC, in addition to the two-fold policy 
goal stated in the law, is given additional mandates. When commenting on the mandate, 
Governor Zhou Xiaochuan of the PBC confirms my interpretation of Article 3 as focusing on 
price stability and inflation and states that: “China’s monetary policy has multiple objectives. 
The first is low inflation; the second is to promote economic growth; the third is to maintain 
full employment and keep the unemployment rate relatively low; the fourth is to keep a 
balanced balance of payments.” (Caixin, 2012).31 Neither of the two latter, full employment 
and the external balance, are mentioned in the law on PBC, and in this section, I will focus on 
the two goals stated in the law; price stability and economic growth. 
Similarly to other central banks, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) uses the inflation rate as a 
measure of price stability and GDP growth as a measure of economic growth, and then 
constructs final targets by the use of these variables. However, since the PBC does not have 
goal independence, it cannot freely set these targets.32 Instead, the State Council sets annual 
inflation and growth targets. Table 3 below shows the annual final targets for GDP growth 
and inflation for the time period 1996 to 2013. Targets are sat annually and presented under 
the “Report on the Work of the Government” during the NPC.33  
Table 3: Final targets for monetary policy 1994-2013 
Year Inflation (%) GDP growth (%) 
1996 10 8 
1997 6 8 
1998 5 8 
1999 2 8 
2000 1 8 
2001 1-2 7 
2002 1-2 7 
2003 1 7 
2004 3 7 
2005 4 8 
2006 3 8 
2007 3 8 
2008 4,8 8 
2009 4 8 
2010 3 8 
                                                 
31 Caixin is a Chinese economic magazine. 
32 The concept of independence are defined and discussed in section 3.3. 
33 The Report on the work of the Government is similar to the American «State of the Union» held by the 
President of USA and is held by the premier at NPC every year.  
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2011 4 8 
2012 4 7,5 
2013 3,5 7,5 
Sources: Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of 
China (2000-2013) and Geiger (2010) 
 
The relative weights put on the two targets, however, are not known. Bell and Feng (2013) 
argue that the focus on inflation in Article 3 in the law on PBC was a result of the two periods 
of high inflation in the late 1980s and mid-1990s, which made the government more cautious 
about high inflation.34  
The claim that price stability is the primary goal for monetary policy is further strengthened 
by several comments made by the previous premier, Wen Jiabao. At a press conference 
following the National People’s Congress (NPC) in 2011, he states that: “inflation is like a 
tiger; once it gets free, it is difficult to put back in the cage” (China Daily, 2011). Premier 
Wen repeated the focus on inflation at his last NPC when he stated that inflation always will 
be one of the most important macro-control targets (Xinhua, 2013). Rapid price rise is 
politically sensitive for the leaders of China and could be a source of instability for China’s 
Communist Party (CCP). Naughton (2011) states that “Inflation is very unpopular in China, 
and when price increases are this evident, it provokes frustration and anger, particular 
among middle-class urban dwellers”.35 However, given that the PBC cannot be considered 
independent, and the fact that Chinese leaders above all are evaluated by their ability to 
contribute to economic growth (Li and Zhou, 2005), it has to be doubted whether the PBC can 
pay less attention to the goal of economic growth. Lower economic growth means lower 
household income growth, which may be a source of social instability. Also, the governors 
and leaders of the PBC are evaluated by their contribution to economic growth, indicating that 
it is worse for the PBC to deviate from the growth target than to deviate from the inflation 
target. If this means that the PBC puts too high weight on economic growth, i.e. tries to 
achieve higher growth than the natural rate, it could lead to an inflation bias. The PBC is well 
aware of this problem and the PBC officials often emphasize the importance of price stability. 
Governor Zhou Xiaochuan states that: “Among the four, keeping inflation at bay has always 
                                                 
34 In 1988 the annual CPI was 18,7 percent and in 1994 it surpassed 24 percent (World Bank Data). Some 
authors, for example Huang et.al (2013), argue that the high inflation in the late 1980s was one of the main 
sources that contributed to the widespread social unrest in 1989 that culminated with the Tiananmen Square 
protest.  
35 The Consumer Price Index (CPI) peaked at 6,5 percent in July 2011 (CEIC Data). 
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been the most important mandate of the central bank and has the heaviest weight” (Caixin, 
2012).  
From table 3, however, it should be clear that the PBC does not operate under any long run 
inflation target, like for example the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of England 
(BoE), the Federal Reserve (FED) or Norges Bank.36 Such long-term targets give the central 
banks flexibility when facing trade-offs between conflicting goals at the same time as it helps 
anchoring the inflation expectations. In China, however, the annual target has changed rapidly 
during the last two decades. Geiger (2010) argues that the use of annual inflation targets is a 
direct result of the lack of independence between the PBC and the government, and states 
that: “Often inflation targets have to be seen as political rather than monetary targets derived 
from an economic rationale” (p.136). I argue that the lack of a long run inflation target makes 
it harder for the PBC to anchor inflation expectations. 
Finally, the annual inflation target should be interpreted as a ceiling or maximum level, rather 
than a desired level. In 2007, premier Wen Jiabao, when presenting the Report on the Work of 
the Government, said: “The overall price level should remain basically stable, the overall 
increase in consumer prices should stay below 3%” (Central People’s Government of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2007) (My emphasis). This stands in contrast to for example the 
BoE, where it is stated that: “Inflation below the target of 2 % is judged to be just as bad as 
inflation above the target” (BoE, 2013)(My emphasis). Similarly, the GDP growth target in 
China should be interpreted as a minimum level.  
For economic growth, it has only happened twice (since 1996) that the target was not reached. 
As a comparison, the inflation target, when interpreted as a maximum level, was only reached 
65 percent of the time over the same period, again indicating that economic growth has been 
the main priority. Such focus on economic growth could lead to a positive inflation bias.37 
However, the rapid comments from Party officials and the PBC officials on the importance of 
price stability, make me conclude that the PBC, in normal times, operates under a kind of 
flexible inflation target, i.e. put some weight on both inflation and economic growth. 
However, this target is only for the short run as the targets for growth and inflation only are 
valid for one year and renewed annually. In section 5, I argue that the lack of a long run and 
                                                 
36 The ECB’s long term inflation target is “close to, but below 2 percent”, while the BoE and the FED operate 
under a 2 percent inflation target, and Norges Bank’s long-run inflation target is 2,5 percent. 
37 The possible inflation bias will be the main topic of section 4 and 5. 
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flexible inflation target increase the possibility for a positive inflation bias in China and I 
argue that several steps could be taken in order to reduce the probability of an inflation bias. 
3.1.2 Intermediate targets 
The intermediate targets should be some economic variables that the central bank can control 
within relative short time lag and they should have a known relationship with both final 
targets and operational targets. Typical intermediate targets include monetary aggregates such 
as M1 or M2, the exchange rate, and some medium- and long run level for interest rates 
(Bofinger, 2001). The PBC officially considers M2-growth as intermediate targets of 
monetary policy (Conway et al, 2010).38 In addition, in box 3.1 below, I argue that the 
exchange rate might be considered an intermediate target of the Chinese monetary policy, 
however, this is not officially stated. 
M2: 
Ever since 1990, the monetary aggregate M2 has been the main intermediate target for the 
PBC (PBC, 2002). The annual targets for M2-growth are presented in table 5 below together 
with the realized annual M2-growth. Similarly to the final targets, the intermediate target is 
determined by the State Council, and cannot be chosen freely by the PBC.  Since 1998, the 
average M2-growth in China has been 17 percent. This is very high compared to developed 
countries and indicates that China still is an emerging economy.39 Since 1994, the realized 
average annual M2-growth has turned out to be higher than the target in 13 out of 20 years 
and every year since 2005. 
 
 
                                                 
38 Also domestic loan growth has been regarded as an intermediate target for monetary policy in China. The 
domestic loan growth has traditionally been closely related to the M2-growth. One problem concerning the 
domestic loan growth as an intermediate target is that it represents a too narrow concept that does not capture 
that an increasing amount of liquidity and capital are kept outside of the banking sector, as discussed in section 
2.3. In time, the broader concept of total social financing (TSF), discussed in section 2.3, may take the role as an 
intermediate target for the PBC. 
39 Since 1998 USA, United Kingdom, Japan and France have had an average M2 growth of respectively 6.6, 
0.15, 6.8 and 6.6 percent (There is no data available for M2-growth in France for the years 1998 and 1999. 6,6 
percent is the average M2-growth since 2000). As a comparison, M2-growth in Brazil, Russia and India was 
16.7, 33.4 and 16.9 respectively (All calculations are based on World Bank Data). 
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Table 4: Targets for and realized M2-growth 1994-2013 
Year Target (%) Realized (%) 
1994 24 31,5 
1995 23-25 29,5 
1996 25 25,3 
1997 23 20,7 
1998 16-18 14,9 
1999 14-15 14,7 
2000 14-15 12,3 
2001 15-16 15,0 
2002 13 13,1 
2003 16 19,2 
2004 17 14,9 
2005 15 16,7 
2006 14 22,1 
2007 16 16,7 
2008 16 17,8 
2009 17 28,4 
2010 17 18,9 
2011 16 17,3 
2012 14 14,4 
2013 1340  
Sources: Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China 
(2000-2013), Geiger (2010) and World Bank Data 
 
The intermediate target needs to show a correlation to the final targets, meaning there must be 
a correlation between M2 growth and inflation. It is debatable whether such a link exists in 
China. Geiger (2010) argues that there indeed exists such a link and reports a correlation 
coefficient for the period 1994-2008 of 0,935.41 In table 5 below, however, I provide 
calculations that suggest more ambiguous results, depending on what period we consider as 
well as the frequency of the reported variables. 
The agents of the economy need time to adjust their behavior. I therefore use lagged data on 
M2-growth because it is reasonable that the M2-growth must lead inflation with some period 
of time. I use 12 and 24-month lagged data for M2-growth and look for correlation with the 
                                                 
40 In an interview following the NPC in 2013, Governor Zhou said that 13 percent should be interpreted as a 
forecast rather than a target. 
41 Geiger (2010) uses monthly data over the period referring to various sources. He does not report whether or 
not the coefficient is calculated using lagged M2 numbers which would be the correct correlation to measure 
because it takes time before the agents of the economy responds to changes in the M2-grwoth. 
32 
 
consumer price index (CPI).42 The results are presented in figure 8 and 9 below, with the 
corresponding correlation coefficients presented in table 5.   
Table 5: Correlation coefficients 12- and 24-month lagged M2-growth and CPI 
 
The calculations based on the annually reported data since 1987 indicates a close relationship 
between M2-growth and inflation in China with a correlation coefficient as high as 0.735. If 
one, on the other hand, restrict the analysis to the years after the mid- and late- 2000s the 
correlation coefficient, using 12-month lagged M2-growth annually reported data, fall to just 
above 0.2. If taken literary, this drop could indicate a weaker link between money growth and 
inflation. However, this result needs to be taken with some caution. The dramatic fall in 
correlation since the mid-2000s could be the result of the global financial crisis and the 
resulting stimulus package that injected more than 4 trillions of RMB into the economy. The 
stimulus package resulted in a M2-growth of 28.4 percent in 2009. The injection of money 
created, as expected, an increase in inflation, but it was first two years later in 2011 that the 
CPI peaked at 5,4 percent.43 If one uses 24-month lagged average annually reported data for 
M2-growth over the period 2009-2013 the corresponding correlation coefficient is indeed 
back at 0.780. This result indicates that instead of getting worse on predicting future inflation, 
M2-growth leads inflation with a longer period of time. This result is to some extent 
strengthened by the more frequently reported CEIC Data, at least if one look at the time after 
the financial crisis where one gets a correlation coefficient of 0,545 by using the 24-month 
lagged data compared to 0,435 if using the 12-month lagged data. Nonetheless, one may ask 
                                                 
42 I also ran the experiment with 3, 6 and 9 month lagged data for M2-growth, which resulted in lower 
correlation than what is presented in table 5. Friedman (1970) argued that it takes about 12-18 months from the 
change in the monetary growth to prices reacts. 
43 End of year change compared to the year before (CEIC Data). 







12-month lag 0,735 0,753 0,219 0,234 
24-month lag 0,661 0,648 0,622 0,780 










12-month lag 0,410 0,405 0,296 0,435 
24-month lag 0,315**  0,105**  0,275 0,545 
*Average annual growth rate in money and quasi money (M2) and annual percentage change in CPI. 
** From 1999. 
*** Until June 2013. 








































Figure 8: Annual data 12-month lag M2-
growth and CPI 1987-2012  
CPI YoY














































Figure 9: Monthly data 12-month lag 
M2 growth and CPI 1998-2013 
12-month lag M2 growth CPI
the question whether the correlation between M2-growth and inflation is sufficiently high. 
None of the calculated correlation coefficients above matches the 0,935 that Geiger (2010) 
reports. Laurenceson and Windsor (2011) use a SVAR model to investigate the connection 
between M2 growth and CPI and find that the link between M2-growth and inflation in China 
“…is far from robust” (p.18). In any case, M2-growth remains the official intermediate target 
for monetary policy in China, and my calculations above suggest that there is indeed a 
correlation between the intermediate target of M2-growth and the final target of price 
stability. One could argue that, given the high M2-growth in China, it is a good thing that the 
correlation between inflation and M2-growth is not higher than what it is. Hence, I argue that 








3.1.3 Operational targets 
Finally, I consider the operational targets, which are the targets the authority are able to 
control within a short time period. The operational target must be closely related to the 
intermediate target, and hence, if the intermediate target is valid, also with the final targets. In 
most cases there are two possible operational targets, one quantitative, like the monetary base 
of the central bank, or a market or price target, like the short-term interest rates. Most 
developed economies have today shifted from monetary base targets towards targeting the 
short-term interest rates.  
Source: CEIC Data Source: World Bank Data 
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Laurens and Maino (2007) conclude that China, when facing a mixture of short-term 
objectives, lacks a well-defined operational target for its monetary policy.  Geiger (2010), on 
the other side, argues that the PBC follows a mixture of the two above-mentioned targets. 
Officially, the PBC is targeting the short-term interest rate, but because there are several 
inefficiencies related to PBC’s interest rate policy they have to fall back on the quantity-based 
measures. I argue that in most cases the operational target of China’s monetary policy seems 
to be the PBC’s base money. In order for the short-term interest rate to be an appropriate 
operational target it must be correlated with the intermediate targets. As I show in the next 
section, this is hardly the case in China, at least as long as we consider M2-growth as the 
single intermediate target. 
 
Box 3.1 The Exchange Rate: An intermediate target for Monetary Policy in China? 
The exchange rate has played an important role for the rapid economic growth in China 
during the reform period. The undervalued currency has led to high demand for Chinese 
goods and subsequently created large current account surpluses. In this box, I will argue that 
the exchange rate has functioned as an intermediate target for the conduction of monetary 
policy in China. 
Since the mid-1990s, China has operated two different types of exchange rate regimes: a de 
facto peg of the RMB against USD in two periods, 1997-2005 and 2008-2010 and a 
crawling regime against a basket of currencies, between 2005-2008 and after 2010, i.e. the 
PBC let the currency fluctuate within a band against a weighted average of the most 
important currencies (See table 6 below).* Since 2005 RMB has appreciated more than 25 
percent, indicating that it was highly undervalued in 2005.  
Should the exchange rate be considered a target for monetary policy in China? As far as I 
know, it has never been stated officially that the exchange rate is a final target of monetary 
policy. I argue, on the other hand, that the exchange rate has to be considered an 
intermediate target, rather than a final target. McKinnon and Schnabl (2009) states that: 
“The main motivation for so fixing the exchange rate was to anchor the domestic price level 
and to stabilize the rate of growth” (p.5). As with M2-growth, the exchange rate needs to be 
related with the final targets in order to be a valid intermediate target. Geiger (2010) argues 
that the exchange rate could work as a nominal anchor and then create stable inflation. It is 







Operating with the exchange rate as an intermediate target for monetary policy does not 
come without costs for China. First, targeting the exchange rate lead to loss of exchange 
rate independence. Second, in order to achieve the desired level of exchange rate the PBC 
must intervene in the foreign exchange market. That is, to prevent the RMB from 
appreciating, the PBC need to purchase foreign exchange. The cost is that by purchasing 
foreign exchange, the PBC increases money supply, which again could lead to an 
overheated economy and high inflation if not sterilized. Sterilization means that the PBC 
neutralize the increase in money supply by a mixture of monetary policy instruments. 
 
There is no doubt that the exchange rate has been some kind of target for the monetary 
policy in China. The way I see it, it must be regarded an intermediate target, even though 
the crawling regime must be regarded as an attempt to let the exchange rate fluctuate more 
freely. By holding the exchange rate stable or fixed, has the PBC anchored the domestic 
inflation at the same time as the undervalued currency has contributed to the economic 
growth. 
Table 6: Exchange rate regime 1994-2013 
Year Exchange Rate (end of year 
RMB/USD) 
1997 Pegged (8,28) 
1998 Pegged (8,28) 
1999 Pegged (8,28) 
2000 Pegged (8,28) 
2001 Pegged (8,28) 
2002 Pegged (8,28) 
2003 Pegged (8,28) 
2004 Pegged (8,28) 
2005 Crawling (8,07) 
2006 Crawling (7,81) 
2007 Crawling (7,30) 
2008 Pegged (6,83) 
2009 Pegged (6,83) 
2010 Crawling (6,62) 
2011 Crawling (6,30) 
2012 Crawling (6,28) 
2013 Crawling (6,18) 
Source: CEIC Data 
 
* The basket includes the USD, the Japanese Yen, the Euro, the South Korean won, the Australian dollar, the 
Canadian dollar, the British pund, the Malaysia ringgit, the Russian ruble, the Singaporean dollar, and the 




3.2 Monetary policy instruments in China 
Monetary policy instruments are what the central bank actually controls. The most important 
future of the instrument is that it affects the operational target and intermediate targets. In this 
section, I describe the most commonly used instruments for the conduction of monetary 
policy in China. Like all other central banks, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) has a number 
of instruments available for reaching the different targets for monetary policy discussed in the 
previous section. Some of these are similar to developed economies’ instruments, like open 
market operations and setting benchmark interest rates, but others, such as reserve 
requirements and window guidance, are different from the commonly used instruments in 
developed economies. As I will show, many of the instruments used, and the efficiency of 
them, are more closely linked up to the exchange rate regime, rather than price stability per se. 
In addition to the instruments in the PBC’s toolkit, the Chinese government also controls 
some prices and wages directly. Since price stability is the policy goal of monetary policy, 
direct price control must therefore be seen as an additional monetary policy instrument. 
3.2.1 Reserve requirements ratio 
Technically, the Reserve Requirements Ratio (RRR) is the minimum amount of reserves that 
the commercial banks must hold as a percentage of its deposits. The reserves are held in the 
PBC, where they earn an interest rate, usually lower than what they could expect from the 
market.  The RRR affects directly bank liquidity. An increase in the RRR will lead to higher 
demand for central bank money as a consequence of commercial banks being less liquid. 
Although the use of minimum reserve requirements has diminished in most developed 
economies (Bofinger, 2001), it still remains one of the most powerful, and frequently used, 
instruments in the PBC’s tool kit.44 As shown in figure 10, the PBC has adjusted the RRR as 
many as 38 times since 2006 and a majority of the changes have been increases. During the 
deflation period following the financial crisis, the PBC reduced the RRR several times and 
then increased it again when the inflation pressure returned in 2010-2011. 
                                                 
44 The Federal Reserve Bank still uses the RRR to some extent, however less frequently and at much lower ratios 





Ma et.al (2011) argues that there are mainly two reasons for why the PBC use the RRR as an 
active monetary policy instrument. First, the reserve requirements are used as a sterilization 
tool. As argued in box 3.1, the PBC has intervened in the foreign exchange market in order to 
keep the exchange rate at an undervalued level. Figure 11 below illustrates the rapid 
increasing foreign exchange reserves following the PBC’s interventions in the foreign 
exchange market. By purchasing foreign exchange the PBC increases money supply in the 
economy, which again could lead to high inflation. To avoid increased pressure on the 
economy and high inflation, the PBC sterilizes the growth in money supply by the use of a 
mixture of monetary policy instruments, most frequently the reserve requirements and open 
market operations. By increasing the RRR, the PBC requires that the commercial banks place 
a larger share of its liquidity in the central bank, and consequently withdraws some of the 
liquidity growth that follows the foreign exchange purchase. The RRR is an efficient 
instrument because it reduces liquidity more permanently and is more cost efficient than for 
example the PBC bills or other open market operations, when the goal is to absorb liquidity 
following the foreign exchange inflows. It differs from other market operations because it is 
not a swap. Bell and Feng (2013) argue that if the PBC instead tried to use the domestic 
interest rate as a tool to reduce the liquidity pressure, it would only further fuel the liquidity 




































































Figure 10: Required Reserve Ratio and CPI (monthly year-on-
year change) 
CPI Required Reserve Ratio





Second, the PBC uses the reserve requirements as a countercyclical instrument. The RRR 
works as a countercyclical tool through several channels. First, and most directly, it reduces 
the money growth. A hike in RRR will mean that the commercial banks have fewer funds 
available for new lending. Since the commercial banks remain the main source of financing, it 
would therefore reduce the money supply and inflation pressure in the overall economy. 
Second, an increase in the RRR signals tighter overall monetary policy and could in itself 
affect market expectations. And third, although banks earn some interest on the reserves, the 
RRR works as a tax on banks and then increases the cost of bank financing because they 
could have earned higher return by lending the money to the market. Additionally, I argue 
that the RRR to some extent could strengthen the structural problems of the financial sector. 
The large SOEs will probably be granted loans also after an RRR hike. The small and 
medium-sized enterprises, however, could be squeezed out of the credit market because they 
cannot afford the higher interest rates required. 
In order for the RRR to be an efficient and useful instrument for the PBC, it should be 
correlated with the intermediate target of M2 growth. Ma et.al (2011) provide some empirical 
evidence of correlation between RRR and the M2 growth, showing that for 2010 the growth 














































































Figure 11: RMB/USD exchange rate and foreign exchange 
reserves 1994-2013 
Foreign Exchange Reserves (bn USD) RMB/USD exchange rate (RHS)
Source: CEIC Data 
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of 19,7 percent. Since RRR often is used together with other tools, it is hard to isolate the 
effects of RRR hikes, but a simple correlation coefficient could give a hint. My calculations 
show that the correlation coefficient between the RRR and M2-growth for the period 2007-
2013 equals –0,479. As expected, an RRR hike is negatively correlated with the M2-growth, 
meaning that higher reserve requirements will lead to lower M2-growth, which one should 
expect. However, the correlation is not too strong indicating that the growth in money supply 
is determined by other factors in addition to the RRR. Even so, the correlation coefficient 
suggests that the RRR is an efficient tool for PBC when trying to control the M2-growth. 
3.2.2 Open market operations 
In open market operations (OMOs) a central bank buys (sells) securities to the participants of 
the financial market, mainly the commercial banks, and thereby injecting (withdrawing) base 
money or liquidity from the financial market (Bofinger, 2001). Since introduced as a 
monetary policy instrument in China in 1998, OMOs have become one of the most important 
instruments of PBC (Bell and Feng, 2013). The monetary policy department (MPD) is 
responsible for managing the OMOs for the PBC, and, as a degree of independence, the PBC 
do not need approval from the State Council to use OMOs. Unlike most developed 
economies, the PBC uses OMOs not to affect the short term interest rate, but rather to affect, 
the monetary base, which is the primary operational target of the PBC, as argued in section 
3.1.3. Similarly to the RRR, the OMOs could both be used as a countercyclical instrument 
and as a tool for drying up the inflows following the exchange rate regime. When used as a 
sterilization tool, the PBC sells domestic currency bonds to the commercial participants in the 
financial market, and consequently withdraw some of the liquidity. When issuing these bonds, 
the PBC creates a potential for losses and profits based on the differences in return on the 
foreign exchange reserves (mainly placed in US treasury bonds) and the bonds issued by the 
PBC. Elliot and Yan (2013) argue that the difference typically has produced a loss for the 
PBC. In order to reduce these losses the bonds issued by the PBC typically yield a below 
market interest rate. Elliot and Yan (2013) argue that the reason that the PBC are able to sell 
these bonds to an interest rate below the market rate is because the banks and other 
institutions are encouraged (or ordered) to buy them from the government. 
There are mainly three types of OMOs that the PBC conduct: central bank bills, also called 
PBC bills;  repurchase and reverse repurchase operations (repo and reverse repos); and what 
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is called short-term liquidity operations. The PBC bills have maturities from three months to 
three years. This is the main instrument used to sterilize foreign exchange market 
interventions as discussed above. The repos are transactions in which the PBC sells securities 
to a lender (typically commercial banks) and then repurchase it later to a price agreed upon. 
The reverse repos are the opposite transaction. Finally, the short-term liquidity operations are 
ad hoc repos, normally of less than 7-days duration (Williams and Wang, 2013). Since 2004, 
OMOs have been conducted twice a week, and the bidding can either be made on price or on 
the quantity (Geiger, 2010). The use of OMOs to fuel the economy whenever needed has 
become standard and expected. 
3.2.3 Interest rates 
Several steps have been taken to liberalize the interest rate control in China. However, Tao 
(2011) argues that these reforms mainly involved interest rates on the interbank market and 
the primary market of government bonds, while the lending rate to non-financial institutions 
and deposit rates still are controlled by the PBC. Formally, the PBC, like most other central 
banks, sets the benchmark interest rate, which most often is considered to be the one-year 
lending rate and the one-year deposit rate. The difference to most other economies is that the 
PBC also controls the interest rates offered by the commercial banks directly. Until 1997, 
interest rates offered by the commercial banks were not allowed to differ from the benchmark 
interest rates at all in either direction (Lardy, 2012). Since then, there has been a gradual 
liberalization of the interest rate control, but China is still far from full interest rate 
liberalization. The commercial banks are only allowed to set the deposit rates with an upper 
limit (i.e. a ceiling), and, up until recently, the lending rate with a lower limit (i.e. a floor). 
This interest rate policy has secured a high interest rate margin for the commercial banks and, 
as a consequence, high profits.45  
The floor on the commercial bank’s lending rates was removed from mid-July 2013 for all 
types of loans, except mortgage. Prior to the change the floor was 30 percent below the PBC 
rate (PBC, 2013b). In theory, the commercial banks may now offer loans as cheaply as they 
may want to, however, this liberalization was more of a symbolic type, since few banks 
offered loans close to the lower limit in the first place, in fact most loans are offered with an 
                                                 
45 In 2012, the after-tax profit was 754,58 billion RMB for the five large state-owned commercial banks, and it 
was 252,63 billion RMB for the 12 joint-stock commercial banks (CEIC Data). 
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interest rate above the PBC rate. In my view, this reflects the narrow financial sector 
described in section 2.3. The lack of competition in the banking sector introduces the 
possibility for the commercial banks to set higher interest rates on loans.  Nonetheless, the 
removal of the floor on lending rates is an important symbolic move towards a full 
liberalization of the interest rates in China.  
On the other side, the more important ceiling on deposit rates remains in place, and stands at 
10 percent above the PBC rate (PBC, 2013b). The ceiling on deposit rates is more important 
because it seems to be more binding, i.e. the deposit rate offered by the commercial banks is 
close to 10 percent above the PBC rate. This means that if the ceiling is lifted commercial 
banks would offer a higher deposit rate. As discussed in section 2.3 the real interest rate on 
deposit has been negative and close to zero for much of the time over the last decade. When 
the real interest rate is negative the depositors, in reality, lose money when placed on a regular 
deposit account in a commercial bank. This has two consequences: first; the low deposit rate 
means that the commercial banks have access to a very cheap source of funding, which again 
leads to low lending rates for borrowers, typically the large SOEs (Lardy, 2012). Second; the 
low return on deposits has led investors to seek higher return in less developed and regulated 
parts of the financial sector, which could lead to financial instability. Some investors invest in 
real estate in a hope for higher return, and a possible housing bubble could then be a direct 
consequence of this interest rate policy in China. If, or perhaps when, the commercial banks 
are allowed to set deposit rates freely, the competition for deposits among smaller banks will 
most likely drive the interest rate upwards and lead to higher real interest rate; as a 
consequence banks’ profit will fall. 
There is no doubt that further liberalization of the commercial interest rates will be needed in 
China. Lardy (2012) states that: “The key element of financial reform is not the introduction 
of ever more complex financial instruments, the accelerated liberalization of capital account 
restrictions, or expanded access by foreign financial services companies to the domestic 
market. Rather it is the elimination of remaining government controls on interest rates on 
both deposits and loans” (p.78). Market-based interest rates would help China rebalance its 
economy from investment and export-driven into an economy fueled by domestic 
consumption. So why does the government not allow for a more rapid interest rate 
liberalization? Bell and Feng (2013) argue that there are mainly two reasons. First, the PBC is 
still constrained by the exchange rate regime and the undervalued RMB. Market-based 
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deposit rates could threaten the PBC’s control over the exchange rate. If a market-based 
interest rate led to higher deposit rates it would increase the cost of the sterilization process, 
explained in section 3.2.1. The commercial banks would demand higher return on the central 
bank bonds, while the return on the central bank’s foreign exchange reserves would remain 
unchanged. Also, higher domestic deposit interest rates could mean that more investors want 
to place their investments in RMB, leading to an upward pressure on the currency. Second, 
the PBC fears that the commercial banks are not solid enough to handle a market-based 
interest rate system. When the ceiling on the deposit rates is lifted, the commercial banks’ 
profit will decrease as the banks will compete for depositors by higher deposit rates. Today, 
no official deposit insurance is at place in China, meaning that if the commercial banks are 
not solid enough, the reduced profit could threaten the credibility and stability of the whole 
Chinese financial system. Finally, I argue that a full liberalization of interest rates could mean 
that the large SOEs, relying on cheap capital from the large banks, could find it hard to raise 
capital from the market. The high profits following low costs on deposits and high return on 
loans have to some extent created room for funding the large SOEs with cheap capital. This 
has contributed to high economic growth during the reform period, but has also created large 
unbalances in the economy with large and inefficient SOEs.  
To adjust and change the benchmark interest rates, the PBC needs approval from the State 
Council. Figure 12 below shows the development in the one-year PBC benchmark interest 
rates in the period 2003-2013. Since 2006 the lending rate has been adjusted only 20 times, 
compared to the 38 changes made to the RRR over the same period. Several authors have 
shown that the link between PBC’s benchmark interest rates and M2-growth (the intermediate 
target) is weak or non-existing (Geiger, 2010 and Goodfriend and Prasad, 2006). Liu et.al. 
(2009) show that, even though there is a long-term link between the benchmark rate and 
inflation (the final target), this link is too weak. The weak correlation between the benchmark 
interest rates with both the intermediate target and the final target means that interest rates as 
an instrument for monetary policy in China is inefficient, if the goal is to affect these targets. 
However, if the target is the market-rates per se, the instrument is, of course, highly efficient. 
The recent step, of removing the floor on the lending rates could indicate a desire to achieve a 
more market-based interest rate system. Such system would most likely prove more efficient 
in affecting the intermediate and final targets of monetary policy.  
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3.2.4 Window guidance 
The official Chinese policy is that the implementation of monetary policy should be market-
based. Credit quotas were abolished in 1998 (Delatte, 2007). However, the PBC still holds 
monthly meetings with the commercial banks to outline its “advise and concerns” about the 
credit conditions across sectors, so called window guidance. Even though it is called window 
guidance, Bell and Feng (2013) argue that it is a more direct instruction from the PBC on the 
commercial banks’ lending decisions. Window guidance must be regarded as a quantitative 
instrument that the PCB uses to influence the real economy through the credit channel. It is 
probably a legacy from the plan economy and early reform period, where the PBC conducted 
monetary policy in accordance with the credit plan.46 Bell and Feng (2013) argue that the 
reason window guidance is such an efficient instrument in China stems from the hierarchy 
system, discussed in section 2, where the PBC has a higher ranking than the commercial 
banks. If the PBC, by using window guidance, is able to dictate the lending decisions of the 
large commercial banks, it would be rather easy to reach an intermediate target of growth in 
domestic loans. That window guidance still plays an important role as an instrument of 
                                                 
46 The credit plan, worked out by the central authorities and bureaucrats, controlled and allocated credit quotas 
over the state budget to the commercial banks. The credit plan was the main instrument of the PBC until 














Figure 12: Lending rate, deposit rate and CPI 2003-2013 
Lending rate one year Deposit rate one year CPI
Source: CEIC Data 
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monetary policy implementation becomes clear in PBC (2013a) where it is stated that: “The 
PBC further improved guidance for macro-credit policy…credit policy will continue to play 
an active role in promoting sustainable and healthy economic development, harmony, and 
stability in the society” (p. 15). 
3.2.5 Capital controls 
Like window guidance, capital controls is a quantitative instrument. Capital controls means 
that the government prevents money from moving in and out of the country freely. The main 
reason for China to have capital controls follows from the “open economy trilemma” (See for 
example Blanchard et.al, 2010). The trilemma states that a country may not simultaneously 
run an independent monetary policy (control the domestic interest rate), target the exchange 
rate and allow full capital mobility. Although China officially has abandoned the fixed 
exchange rate regime and now allows the exchange rate to fluctuate more freely, the capital 
controls in China remains binding. In 2002, as an attempt to loosen the capital controls, the 
Chinese government initiated the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor program (QFII), 
which controls the number of foreign investors and the amount of money invested in the 
domestic stock markets. The QFII is a certification system which allows the approved foreign 
investor to trade RMB denominated securities at the domestic stock markets. The investors 
are approved by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), and the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), a bureau of PBC, decides the size of each 
investor’s quota.47 By 2012, more than 200 investors were approved for investment in RMB 
denominated securitites (CSRC, 2013b). The capital controls means that PBC more freely can 
set the domestic interest rate, without causing a large degree of capital inflows, and help PBC 
control both the domestic price level and the exchange rate.48 
3.2.6 Wage and price controls 
Although the National Price Law states that the vast majority of prices shall be market-based, 
the government still remains in control of many prices. Naughton (2008), who argues that 
government-controlled prices are more and more used as an instrument, distinguishes between 
government-set prices and temporary government price-control interventions. The former 
                                                 
47 Since 2006, Norway, through the Norges Bank and the Norges Bank Investment Management, hold one of the 
largest investment quotas (CSRC, 2013b).  
48 This is closely related to the concept of exchange rate independence, which is explained in detail in section 3.3 
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refers to the prices directly managed by the central government. These prices are mainly set 
by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and its Department of Price. 
Among the most important prices directly controlled by the government are the prices on 
natural gas, electricity, transport rates and some medicines. Temporary government price-
control interventions, on the other hand, are legally mandated to be temporary. Naughton 
(2008) argues that the government applies such interventions in situations where price 
determination is dispersed among many small suppliers, typically in the agriculture sector. 
The government’s price control is of course very important for monetary policy. In section 
3.1, I concluded that the PBC, at least to some extent, operates under a main policy goal of 
price stability. By using its monetary policy instrument, the PBC tries to control the market-
based prices. On the other side, the PBC has no control over the government-controlled 
prices. If these prices are important enough, one could get large changes in inflation without 
PBC being able to control it.  
The government also controls wages, but in a more indirect way. Since 2006 the average 
wage of urban workers has more than doubled (National Bureau of Statistics, 2012). 
However, there are quite large differences within the country. For example, the average wage 
of an urban worker in Beijing and Shanghai is more than twice the size of the average wage of 
urban workers in 14 other provinces. Economic theory states that if wages are freely set in the 
market, a large wage gap would lead to a massive migration to the places with higher wages. 
Although it has been a rapid urbanization of China, and migrants constitute more than 10 
percent of the population in provinces such as Shanghai (Naughton, 2007), the government 
increases the opportunity cost of migration by using the hukou-system.49 By tying the 
population to the provinces where they are registered, the government efficiently reduces the 
numbers of migrants and then reduces the wage pressure in the urban areas. Economic theory 
and numerous empirical papers have shown that there is a close link between wage inflation 
and price inflation, and that the two form a wage-price spiral where increasing prices and 
wages push each other further (see for example Blanchard, 1985). This means that, even 
though the hukou system and wage controls are not in place as a monetary policy instrument 
per se, it clearly affects the policy goal of price stability, as the system reduces the pressure on 
urban wages. 
                                                 
49 A hukou, or, household registration, officially identifies a person as a resident of a city or province. Although 
there has been some liberalization to the system over the last decade, it still remains difficult for a worker to 
benefit from  social welfare, education, health care etc. without a household registration from the city or 
province he or she are working in (Halskov Hansen and Thøresen, 2013).  
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3.3 The (lack of) independence of People’s Bank of 
China 
Bofinger (2001) defines three types of central bank independence; goal independence, 
instrument independence and personal independence. In addition, I will consider what I call 
exchange rate independence. The central bank has goal independence if it freely chooses the 
goal and targets for the monetary policy, without any interference from the government. 
Instrument independence reflects the central bank’s ability to freely use the instruments 
available when trying to reach the goals. Personal independence reflects the extent of 
personal or political pressure the governors and leaders of the central bank conduct monetary 
policy under. Finally, a central bank has exchange rate independence only if it operates under 
a floating exchange rate regime or can conduct monetary policy without holding the exchange 
rate fixed or close to a certain value or target. 
In general, there are many reasons to delegate the conduction of monetary policy to an 
independent central bank. Most importantly, the preferences of a central bank and politicians 
and other institutions tend to differ. Politicians could be interested in putting higher weight on 
economic growth prior to an election or to secure social stability. Other institutions may want 
to implement a monetary policy that better suits their preferences and interests. If the lack of 
independence leads to a higher weight on economic growth, the result could be a positive 
inflation bias.50 Delegating the conduction of monetary policy to an independent central bank 
may also secure a longer perspective in the monetary policy, which could reduce the volatility 
in both inflation and output. Empirically, many authors have showed that central bank 
independence is in fact negatively correlated with the level of inflation.51 More recently, in 
the wake of the global financial crisis, some authors have considered the connection between 
central bank independence and financial stability and find more ambiguous results. Klomp 
and de Haan (2009) argue that there is a negative correlation between central bank 
independence and financial instability. Berger and Kißmer (2013) on the other side argue that 
such connection does not exist.  
Measuring central bank independence is far from an accurate science, not the least in China 
where dependence is not formally stated, but of a more informal type. In this section, I will 
make use of the different definitions of central bank independence and argue that the PBC 
                                                 
50 The economic theory behind this is explained in detail in section 4. 
51 See for example Alesina and Summers (1993) and Berger et al. (2000) 
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still suffers under severe shortcomings in respect to central bank independence. Although the 
independence has increased substantially since the monobank system under the pre-reform 
period, it is still clear that the PBC is a direct subordinate to the State Council, which again 
has close links to the China Communist Party (CCP). 
3.3.1 Goal independence 
From the law on PBC it is clear that the PBC does not have goal independence. Article 2 
states “The People’s Bank of China shall, under leadership of the State Council, formulate 
and implement monetary policies…” (PBC, 2003a). Hence, the PBC lies under the leadership 
of the State Council at the same level as other ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), and can by 
definition not be viewed as an independent institution. The PBC cannot freely set its targets; 
not the final, intermediate or the operational. Instead, these targets are defined by the State 
Council as explained in section 3.1. 
3.3.2 Instrument independence 
In order for the PBC to have instrument independence it should be able to use its instruments 
freely without any interference when conducting monetary policy. Table 7 below summarizes 
the instruments discussed in section 3.2 above. Red color indicates lack of instruments 
independence, while green color goes in favor of instrument independence. From the table it 
is clear that only OMOs and window guidance are fully controlled by the PBC, illustrated by 
green color in all three columns. If the central bank wants to adjust the required reserve ratio 
or the benchmark interest rates, it needs approval from the State Council. Even though the 
State Council, of course, will take the PBC’s recommendations into account when making 
their decisions, I find it reasonable to conclude that the PBC does not have instrument 
independence. In some cases, like with price and wage controls, the monetary policy 





Table 7: Instruments of the monetary policy 





Yes No Yes 
Reserve 
Requirements 
Yes No Yes 
Open Market 
operations 
Yes Yes No 
Window 
guidance 
Yes Yes No 
Capital controls Yes  No Yes 
Price and wage 
controls 
No No Yes 
Source: Geiger (2010) and PBC (2003a)  
 
My conclusion is further supported by the law on PBC. Article 5 below clearly states that the 
PBC must have the blessing of the State Council prior to making important changes: 
“The People’s Bank of China shall report its decisions to the State Council for approval 
concerning the annual money supply, interest rate, foreign exchange rates and other 
important matters specified by the State Council before they are implemented” (PBC, 2003a, 
Article 5)(My emphasis)  
However, if we take article 7 in the law on PBC literally, it is only the State Council that can 
direct PBC decisions; no individuals or other government departments can give directives: 
“The People’s Bank of China shall, under the leadership of the State Council, implement 
monetary policies, perform its functions and carry out its business operations independently 
according to law and be free from intervention by local governments, government 
departments at various levels, public organizations or individuals” (PBC, 2003a, Article 
7)(My emphasis) 
This is important because it means that for example the MOF and the NDRC have no 
authority to dictate the actions of the PBC. As the indirect owner of several of the largest 
commercial banks, the MOF could have interest in a more bank-friendly monetary policy, but 
article 7 clearly states that the MOF does not have the authority to make the PBC implement 
such a policy. Similarly, the local governments, who traditionally have high focus on 
economic growth, cannot make the PBC run a looser monetary policy. 
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3.3.3 Personal independence  
I now consider the third type of central bank independence: personal independence. The 
interesting aspect is whether or not the governor and the leadership of the PBC are 
independent, i.e. is the governor able to resist formal and informal pressure from the 
government? The law on PBC, in Article 10, states that the governor is nominated by the 
State Council and appointed by the National People’s Congress (NPC), however, in practice, 
the NPC will always appoint the person nominated by the State Council.52 Deputy Governors 
are appointed and removed by the premier of the State Council directly. Although there are no 
formal requirements of the leadership of the PBC, it is unlikely for the governor of PBC not to 
simultaneously hold a high position within the communist party. Since 1978 all governors 
have at least been a member of the Central Committee of Chinas Communist Party (CCP).53 
The fact that the governor is the final authority in all PBC decisions and holds a high position 
within the CCP indicates that the PBC does not have personal independence. It raises the 
possibility that the governor of the PBC will run the institution in a way that is best for his 
career in CCP and not in the best of the central bank and the monetary policy. However, as 
Bell and Feng (2013) argue, the future political career of any minister or governor is closely 
linked with the performance of the institution he or she is head of, which may dampen any 
negative consequences following the lack of personal independence.   
Although the monetary policy committee (MPC) only has an advisory role in the conduction 
of monetary policy in China, as discussed in section 2.4.4, the fact that several of the external 
members have close ties to other institutions with self-interest in the way monetary policy is 
conducted further weakens the personal independence of the PBC. In addition to holding 
positions in other institutions, several of the members in the MPC simultaneously hold 
positions within the party system, indicating that they face the same dilemma as Governor 
Zhou Xiaochuan. 
 
                                                 
52 Article 10 of the law on PBC states that whenever the NPC is not in session, the Standing Committee of the 
NPC shall decide the governor. The law also states that the central bank governor are appointed and removed by 
the President. 
53 The current Governor, Zhou Xiaochuan, is not a member of the 18th Central Committee of CCP (2012-2017), 
but he was a member of the 16th and 17th. The fact that he is not is a member of the current Central Committee 
could indicate that he will be replaced as Governor within a short time period.  
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3.3.4 Exchange rate independence 
During the last decades, China’s monetary policy must be characterized as a fixed exchange 
rate regime (see box 3.1). Such regimes typically impose a constraint on a country’s monetary 
policy. If the domestic interest rates diverge much from foreign rates, the country could be 
subject to high levels of capital inflows, which will destabilize the economy. The reason is 
that investors will hold the currency that yield the highest expected return, where the expected 
return equals the interest rate earned on the currency plus any changes in the exchange rate. If 
the expected return on holding RMB is greater than the expected return on holding USD, the 
investors will borrow in USD and invest in RMB, creating a liquidity inflow to China.54 
Hence, when China operates a fixed exchange rate regime, they must consider the foreign 
interest rate when setting the domestic, i.e. China lacks exchange rate independence. 
However, I argue that there are mainly three reasons why China still may set the domestic 
interest rate quite independently. First, the theory above assumes perfect capital mobility, i.e. 
investors can freely decide where to invest their capital. As explained in section 3.2, China 
operates strict capital controls and by that limits the problem of differences in interest rates 
level. Second, foreign investors are risk averse, and since there is a large degree of uncertainty 
when investing in the Chinese market, small differences in expected return are not enough to 
attract investors. Third, the sterilization system in China has so far proven quite successful. 
Nonetheless, in section 3.2, I showed that many of the most frequently used monetary policy 
instruments are closely related to the exchange rate policy, such as the reserve requirements 
and the open market operations. Given this, I will argue that the PBC loses some of its 
independence, due to the exchange rate policy.  By letting the exchange rate float freely, the 
PBC could retain this independence. 
3.4 The (lack of) transparency of People’s Bank of 
China 
Central bank transparency is important for providing the public with information about the 
targets, instruments, data and conduction of monetary policy. If the central bank wants to 
affect the market expectations, transparency is essential. The more transparent the central 
bank is the easier it is for the general public to have accurate and consistent expectations. 
According to The European Central Bank (ECB): “Transparency means providing the public 
                                                 
54 See for example Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) or Rødseth (2000) for more on exchange rate mechanisms. 
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with all relevant information on the ECB’s strategy, assessment, and policy decisions as well 
as on its procedures in an open, clear and timely manner” (ECB, 2013). Geraats (2002), who 
defines central bank transparency as the absence of asymmetric information between the 
policy makers and the economic agents, takes it one step further and distinguishes between 
five aspects of central bank transparency: political, economic, procedural, policy and 
operational transparency. Political transparency refers to the openness about policy targets, 
objectives and institutional arrangements. Economic transparency focuses on the data, 
statistics and economics used for monetary policy. Procedural transparency refers to clarity 
about how policy decisions are taken. Policy transparency refers to clarity with respect to the 
current stance of monetary policy and the outlook for the future. And, finally, operational 
transparency concerns the clarity on monetary policy implementation. 
Crowe and Meade (2007) construct an index for central bank transparency where China and 
the PBC receive the lowest score.55 Since then, the PBC has taken steps to increase the 
transparency of monetary policy. Despite these efforts, there is no doubt that the PBC lacks 
behind when considering transparency, creating a large degree of uncertainty about the 
conduction of monetary policy in China. The result may be that the PBC finds it hard to 
control the market expectations and actions, as a recent example shows, see box 3.2. Below, I 
further discuss the transparency of the PBC, making use of the five definitions of central bank 
transparency. 
3.4.1 Political transparency 
The discussion of targets and goals in section 3.1 makes it clear that the PBC lacks political 
transparency. There is still a great level of uncertainty regarding the actual goals and targets 
of Chinese monetary policy. Although the policy goal of monetary policy is stated in the law 
of PBC, it is not clear how this article shall be interpreted. Also, despite much effort and 
many comments from PBC officials, it is still unclear what weight the authorities put on price 
stability and economic growth when conducting monetary policy. However, the many 
comments made in favor of price stability (see section 3.1), must be interpreted as the PBC 
acknowledging this problem and try to clarify the targets of the monetary policy for the 
general public. 
                                                 
55 The United Kingdom and the Bank of England receive the highest score. 
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3.4.2 Economic transparency 
The field of transparency where the PBC has taken the largest step in recent years is economic 
transparency. Table 8 shows some of the information provided regularly by the PBC, and it is 
clear that most of the information reported regards data and statistics. Especially the three 
reports (Monetary Policy Report, Annual Report and Financial Stability Report) are 
comprehensive reports with lots of information. A problem with the information presented by 
the PBC, however, concerns the credibility of the statistics. Several authors argue that this 
official statistics at best are inaccurate and at worst misleading (See for example Huang et.al, 
2013b). This is a general issue of official data and statistics from China, and I will return to 
this discussion when considering inflation data in section 5.1 below. However, if not the data 
that the PBC presents are credible, one could hardly argue that the central bank is economic 
transparent, even though the data is published. 
Table 8: Publications of the PBC 
What Frequency Type of transparency 
Monetary Policy Report: Normally consists 
of the five parts: 1. Monetary and Credit 
Performance, 2. Monetary Policy Operations, 
3. Financial Market Analysis, 4. 
Macroeconomic Analysis and 5. Monetary 
Policy Stance to be Adopted in the Next 
Stage 





Annual Report:  
Covers more than 140 pages and consists of 
reports from most of the departments and 
bureaus of PBC. Statistical Annex. 
Annually Economic transparency 
Financial Stability Report: 
A detailed analysis of the development and 
stability of financial sector in the previous 
year. 
Annually Economic transparency 
Summary Financial Market Performance:  
Short summary of the resent development of 
the financial markets. 
Monthly Economic transparency 
Statistics: 
Financial statistics published monthly more 





Source: People’s Bank of China  
 
                                                 
56 Latest general statistics published on the English version of PBC’s homepage are from 2010. On the Chinese 
version however the statistics are updated quarterly. 
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3.4.3 Policy transparency 
The monetary policy reports, published by the PBC, discuss to some degree the current stance 
and the outlook of monetary policy in China, and are clearly an attempt to increase the policy 
transparency of the PBC. The reports are comprehensive works and the information provided 
gives some transparency about how monetary policy is conducted. 
3.4.4 Procedural transparency 
In my view, of the five aspects of transparency defined by Geraats (2002), procedural 
transparency is the most problematic for the PBC. This is clearly caused by the lack of 
independence: The fact that it is unclear how, by who and even why the PBC takes policy 
decisions indicates that decisions, in reality, are being taken outside of the PBC, or at least 
with clear guidance from individuals outside the PBC. The decision making process was 
discussed in section 2.6 and as concluded there, issues of important matters could be taken all 
the way at the top in the Communist Party. 
3.4.5 Operational transparency 
Unlike many other central banks, like the FED and the BoE, the PBC does not release minutes 
or hold press conferences after policy meetings. After the meetings in the monetary policy 





Box 3.2 The lack of transparency and the “credit crunch” 
A recent and illuminating example of the lack of transparency of the PBC is the “credit 
crunch”. In June 2013, worrying statistics and data appeared indicating a possible 
slowdown or hard landing of the Chinese economy. Normally, such data are met by 
looser credit from the PBC, but this time the PBC did not react. Rumors about banks 
defaulting on loans and a frozen inter-bank market started to spread. During mid-June the 
panic started to show on the interest rates, the seven-day repo rate jumped from 2,78 
percent in May to over 10 percent in mid-June, and on 20 June,  the overnight repo rate 
peaked at 25 percent. In the inter-bank market, interest rates hit record high 13 percent 
(see figure 13). During all this, the PBC kept silent; no comments or announcements. 
Then, suddenly, on 23 June, the PBC published an announcement, dated to 17 June, at 
the homepage, indicating some injection of capital into the money market. The market 
reacted immediately and interest rates started to decline once again. The example 
illustrates how the financial market lacks information about how and why the authorities 
conduct monetary policy.  
  















Figure 13: Interbank interest rates May - July 2013 
Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate (SHIBOR): Overnight
Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate (SHIBOR): 1 Week
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4 The Barro Gordon Model 
The discussion so far has made it clear that the People’s Bank of China (PBC) has several 
shortcomings regarding independence and transparency when conducting monetary policy. 
Formally, article 2 of the law on PBC, discussed in section 3.3, makes it clear that the PBC 
cannot be considered independent of the rest of the government and the party. This lack of 
independence and the uncertainty concerning goals and targets may reduce the PBC’s 
credibility in its conduction of monetary policy. Reduced credibility for the PBC could mean 
that the central bank finds it hard to control the inflation expectations, and consequently, it 
could mean that the PBC are unable to reach the policy goal of price stability. In this section, I 
will set up a theoretical model that shows what the consequences of such lack of credibility 
may be. In section 5, I will search for such consequences in the Chinese economy. 
The theory underlying the importance of central bank independence and transparency builds 
on Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983).57 Barro and Gordon (1983) 
showed that when the central bank operates under discretion, i.e. re-optimizing monetary 
policy in every period in time, the central bank will have incentives to create higher inflation 
than expected and by that push output above its natural level. This will be optimal for the 
central bank if the socially optimal output level exceeds the natural level of output. However, 
if the agents in the economy understand the central bank’s incentives and preferences, such 
surprise inflation will not be possible. The agents will adjust their inflation expectations 
according to the knowledge about the central bank incentives, and, as a consequence, it will 
evolve a consistent positive inflation bias without any effect on output. In section 5.1, I 
shortly present the central bank preferences and the set-up of the economy, and discuss the 
model’s relevance for the Chinese economy. In Section 5.2, I present optimal monetary policy 
under discretion and explain why a positive inflation bias will evolve.  
4.1 Model set-up 
There are two participants in the model; the monetary authority, which I call the central bank, 
and the private sector, which I call the general public. The economy is assumed to be supply-
driven and aggregate output is described by the Lucas supply curve:  
                                                 
57 The model I use in my thesis draws on Walsh (2010), which presents a more comprehensive discussion of the 
Barro Gordon Model and possible solutions to the inflation bias problem.  
56 
 
𝑦𝑡 =  𝑦𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 +  𝛾(𝜋𝑡 −  𝜋𝑡𝑒) + 𝜀𝑡,           𝛾 > 0,𝐸𝑡−1(𝜀𝑡) = 0                                            (1)       
Here, 𝑦𝑡 is the realized output in period t, 𝑦𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 is the natural level of output in period t, 𝜋𝑡 
is the realized inflation in period t,  𝜋𝑡𝑒  is the general public’s inflation expectation for period 
t, and 𝜀𝑡 is a supply shock, which on average equals zero. The natural level of output is the 
level of output that would be produced in general equilibrium in the absence of any market 
failures, like monopolistic competition, tax distortions or other distortions. From equation (1) 
it is evident that the realized output will differ from the natural level only if the realized 
inflation differs from what the general public expects, or if there is any supply shock present 
in the economy. The size of the parameter 𝛾 decides how much unexpected inflation will 
affect output; higher 𝛾 will give larger effect. It is important to notice that the aggregate 
output is supply-driven, so that higher realized inflation than expected will create incentives 
to produce more and, as a consequence, increase output. Walsh (2010) motivates equation (1) 
with a one-period nominal wage contract, set at the beginning of period t, based on what the 
general public expect the inflation to be in period t. If then the realized inflation exceeds the 
expected inflation, the real price of the produced good will increase (or the real costs 
decrease), and lead the producers to increase the output to take advantage of the increased 
marginal profit (or decreased marginal cost). If, on the other side, the general public perfectly 
expects what level of inflation there will be in period t, the aggregate output will equal the 
natural level plus any supply shock. A positive supply shock will increase output above its 
natural level, however, the effect following a supply shock is assumed to die out after one 
period. The presence of the supply shock creates room for stabilizing monetary policy for the 
central bank.  
The supply-driven economy, described by equation (1), differs from what has become the 
standard way of thinking in modern macroeconomics, where aggregate output most 
commonly is decided from the demand side of the economy. However, I will argue that the 
supply-driven economy actually fits the Chinese reality quite well, since the Chinese 
economy still is dominated by the large public sector and a powerful state. Households’ 
consumption accounts for only about 36 percent of China’s GDP in 2012, while fixed 
investment accounts for more than 45 percent, where a large share of the investment comes 
from the government directly or indirectly through the large SOEs (IMF, 2013).  
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As inflation is the driving force in the economy, the next equation needed for the setup of the 
model is a link between the actions of the central bank and inflation. This is given by:     𝜋𝑡 = ∆𝑚𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡 ,                 𝐸𝑡−1(𝑣𝑡) = 0                                                                         (2)  
Here ∆𝑚𝑡 is the growth rate of money supply and 𝑣𝑡 is a monetary policy shock that is 
assumed to be uncorrelated with the supply shock. The instrument of the central bank is then 
the money supply which it is assumed that the central bank controls directly.  
Equation (2) corresponds well with the practice of the PBC. In section 3.2, I argued that the 
PBC still relies on quantitative instruments, and in section 3.1.2, I showed that the growth rate 
of M2 still remains the official intermediate target for monetary policy in China. However, in 
the same section, I showed that there is not a perfect correlation between M2-growth and 
inflation. To capture this fact I add the monetary policy shock, 𝑣𝑡 , to equation (2). It appears 
after the central bank has adjusted the money supply, meaning that the central bank cannot 
fully control what the realized inflation will be in period t. All other factors that affects 
realized inflation are captured in the monetary policy shock. It is assumed that these factors 
cannot be controlled by the central bank. 
The central bank wants to maximize welfare and do so by adjusting its instruments in order to 
minimize the following one-period loss function:58  
        𝐿𝑡 =  12 [(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋∗)2 +  𝜆(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦∗)2],                     𝜆,𝑦∗ > 0,𝜋∗ ≥ 0                             (3)                                               𝑦∗ >  𝑦𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙                                                                                              
Here 𝜋∗ and 𝑦∗ is the socially optimal inflation and output target respectively, and 𝜆 is the 
relative weight the central bank put on output. The higher 𝜆, the more the central bank care 
about output growth deviations from 𝑦∗ relative to inflation. It is assumed that the social 
optimal level of output, which the central bank targets when conducting monetary policy, 
exceeds the natural level of output. This is crucial for the model, and there may be several 
reasons why this is the case. First, the natural output level may be “too low”, due to market 
                                                 
58 I assume that the society as a whole and the central bank have the same preferences, i.e. the central bank is 
maximizing the social welfare by minimizing equation (3). Moreover, I will restrict my analysis to one period, 
however, the model could easily be modified to an model of an infinite number of periods, where the central 
bank minimize an intertemporal loss function. Such modification would not add any interesting points to the 
model, since the central bank re-optimizes in every period.  
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failures such as monopolistic competition or tax distortions. Or, it may be that the central 
bank tries to stabilize output around a “too high” level, due to political pressure.  
Is it likely that the PBC tries to stabilize output around an output level that exceeds the natural 
level? In section 3.1.1, I discussed the possibility that the leaders of the PBC puts too much 
weight on economic growth because of their personal interests and careers. If the wish for 
future promotion, within the state and the party, makes the leaders of the PBC aiming for a 
higher output than the natural level, the model describes the Chinese situation well. In 
addition, I will argue that the Chinese exchange rate policy may justify why the social optimal 
policy is targeted. In box 3.1, I showed that the exchange rate has been pegged to the USD 
and kept undervalued for most of the reform period. This policy has created high demand for 
Chinese-produced goods and consequently higher growth. In other words, the undervalued 
currency has created output growth above the natural level. As a consequence, I argue that 
PBC have targeted a socially optimal output target which exceeds the natural level that would 
have evolved if the exchange rate had been floating freely. 
As long as  𝜆 > 0 in equation (3), the central bank operates under a flexible inflation target 
where deviations from both the inflation target and output target create losses. In this way 
equation (3) represents, in a good way, the two-fold goal of monetary policy in China 
presented in section 3.1.1. Notice, however, that in equation (3) deviations in both directions 
create equally large losses for the central bank, meaning that realized inflation above target is 
just as bad as realized inflation below target. In section 3.1.1, I argued that the inflation target 
and output target for the Chinese monetary policy must be seen as maximum and minimum 
limits respectively; inflation below the target is perfectly acceptable for the PBC. 
Nevertheless, I will argue that the central bank loss function in this model still represents the 
situation in China quite well. First, although the annual inflation targets are maximum levels, 
I will argue that deflation will create losses for the PBC. So as long as the annual inflation 
targets are sat relatively low, inflation too far below the target will create a loss. Second, a too 
high economic growth would not be sustainable over time, and indicates serious distortions to 
the economy. The PBC knows that growth that exceeds the annual target only is possible by 
further building up under distortions in the economy such as the undervalued exchange rate, 
the narrow financial sector and the investment-driven growth. In a comment to Financial 
Times on 08.09.13, Premier Li Keqiang wrote: “We can no longer afford to continue with the 
old model of high consumption and high investment. Instead, we must take a holistic 
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approach in pursuing steady growth, structural readjustment and further reform” (Financial 
Times, 2013). In other words; growth that heavily exceeds the annual targets creates a loss for 
the society because it harms the desired rebalancing of the economy. In sum, I therefore argue 
that the central bank’s loss function in equation (3) is relevant for China and the PBC. 
Finally, the sequence and timing of the model is crucial for the results and is illustrated in 
figure 14 below. First, the general public decides their inflation expectations, 𝜋𝑡𝑒 , and set the 
wages according to these.  Next, the supply shock, 𝜀𝑡, is realized and the central bank sets the 
money growth, ∆𝑚𝑡. Finally the monetary policy shock, 𝑣𝑡, is realized and actual inflation 
and output follows directly from the model solutions. That the general public commits to a 
wage contract prior to the central bank sets money growth is a key assumption of the model. 
This means that the central bank may surprise the general public with an inflation that differs 
from the expected one, and by that create higher output. 
Figure 14 : The sequential timing of the Barro Gordon Model 
 
 
In what follows, I will assume that the central bank conducts monetary policy under 
discretion. That is, the central bank re-optimizes its monetary policy in every period. This is 
probably the most realistic scenario, and lies closest to what most central banks do today, not 
the least the PBC. However, as will be evident in next section, the consequence of conducting 
monetary policy under discretion could be that a positive inflation bias evolves. The literature 
suggests several possible solutions to the inflation bias problem.59 However, as I argue that 
                                                 
59 In the appendix, I discuss three possible solutions to the inflation bias problem: i) committing to a policy rule, 
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none of the suggested solutions to the inflation bias problem are relevant for China today, I 
will consequently restrict the discussion of the Barro Gordon model in this section to the 
optimal monetary policy conducted under discretion. 
4.2 Optimal monetary policy under discretion 
Under discretion, the central bank will try to maximize social welfare by minimizing the loss 
function in every period, subject to the Lucas supply curve, and the link between monetary 
policy and inflation, taking the inflation expectations, 𝜋𝑡𝑒 , as given. By substituting for 
equations (1) and (2) in equation (3), the central bank solves the following minimization 
problem in every period t: 
𝑚𝑖𝑛∆𝑚𝑡 𝐿𝑡 = 12 [(∆𝑚𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡 − 𝜋∗)2 + 𝜆{𝑦𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝛾(∆𝑚𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡𝑒) + 𝜀𝑡 − 𝑦∗}2]            (4)                            
The first-order-condition of the minimization problem, solved for ∆𝑚𝑡, then gives the optimal 
monetary policy as: 
∆𝑚𝑡
𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 =  11 + 𝜆𝛾2 𝜋∗ + 𝜆𝛾1 + 𝜆𝛾2 �𝑦∗ − 𝑦𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙� + 𝜆𝛾21 + 𝜆𝛾2 𝜋𝑡𝑒 − 𝜆𝛾1 + 𝜆𝛾2 𝜀𝑡 −  𝑣𝑡      (5) 
First, notice that it is optimal for the central bank to react to the two shocks in the economy. If 
the central bank could observer the monetary policy shock, it would have been optimal to 
react one to one with it, and by that neutralize it.60 However, as explained in section 4.1, the 
monetary policy shock is first realized after the central bank has conducted monetary policy 
and cannot be controlled by the central bank.  Since the central bank not are able to control 
the monetary policy shock it may be dropped from equation (6) which give the optimal 
monetary policy as in equation 6 below: 
∆𝑚𝑡











𝜀𝑡                        (6)    
The supply shock, on the other side, is realized before the central bank conducts monetary 
policy, and we see from equations (5) and (6) that it is optimal for the central bank to react to 
                                                                                                                                                        
have combined several of these solutions to create a modern central bank that has a greater probability of 
avoiding an inflation bias. 




such shocks. A negative supply shock will mean lower output. It will then be optimal for the 
central bank to create higher inflation to boost output again as a stabilizing policy. This seems 
to correspond well to the practice of the PBC. Under the global financial crisis, the PBC 
reduced both the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) and the interest rate several times to face 
the weakened economic growth outlook. Figure 1, in section 2.3, shows that the result indeed 
was higher M2-growth. As showed by equation (6) that the more the central bank care about 
output, i.e. the higher 𝜆, the more will the central bank react to supply shocks. It will, 
however, never be optimal for the central bank to fully neutralize the supply shock because 
stabilizing growth comes at the cost of inflation deviations as the central bank can only affect 
output through inflation. 
Next, it can be seen directly from equation (6) that optimal monetary policy and therefore also 
realized inflation and output, depends on how the general public forms their expectations, i.e. 
the value of 𝜋𝑡𝑒 . In the following, I will distinguish between two cases: one where the general 
public believes in the inflation target, 𝜋∗, and one where the general public have rational 
expectations. 
4.2.1 Inflation expectations equals the inflation target 
If the general public expects the realized inflation to equal the inflation target communicated 
by the central bank (i.e. 𝜋∗) it means that the inflation expectations are given by:                                 𝜋𝑡𝑒 =  𝜋∗                                                                                                           (7)  
When inserting this into equation (6) and solving for optimal money growth, the solution 
simplifies to: 
                  ∆𝑚𝑡 =  𝜋∗ + 𝜆𝛾1 + 𝜆𝛾2 �𝑦∗ − 𝑦𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙� − 𝜆𝛾1 + 𝜆𝛾2 𝜀𝑡                                                (8) 
Realized inflation and output for period t is then found by inserting equation (8) back into 
equations (2) and (1): 
𝜋𝑡
𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 = 𝜋∗ + 𝜆𝛾1 + 𝜆𝛾2 �𝑦∗ − 𝑦𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙� − 𝜆𝛾1 + 𝜆𝛾2 𝜀𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡                      >  𝜋∗                   (9) 
𝑦𝑡
𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 =  𝑦𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝜆𝛾21+𝜆𝛾2 �𝑦∗ − 𝑦𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙� + 11+𝜆𝛾2 𝜀𝑡 + 𝛾𝑣𝑡           > 𝑦𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙               (10)  
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From equation (9) it is evident that it is optimal for the central bank, on average, to create 
inflation above the inflation target! The inflation bias equals the difference between realized 
inflation, absent any shocks, and the inflation target (indicated by the red box in equation (9)). 
Why it is optimal for the central bank to create surprise inflation above the expected level is 
evident from equation (10). By creating surprise inflation the central bank manages to push 
aggregate output above its natural level (elevated output indicated by the red box in equation 
(10)). How much the central pushes output above the natural level is increasing in both how 
much weight the central bank places on output, 𝜆, and, the effect an inflation surprise has on 
aggregate output, 𝛾. At the same time, the inflation bias is increasing in 𝜆 and decreasing in 
𝛾.61 The central bank faces a trade-off between pushing aggregate output above its natural 
level, i.e. closer to the social optimal level, and avoid too large inflation deviation between 
realized inflation and the social optimal target, as the central bank can only affect output 
through inflation. Higher 𝜆 means that the central bank cares more about output deviations 
from the social optimal target, and consequently accepts a higher inflation bias. Likewise, 
higher 𝛾 means that more is gained in terms of higher output for each unit increase inflation 
above expectation, and less inflation deviations are necessary to push output above its natural 
level.  
It is important to notice, however, that realized inflation and output could also depend on the 
realized value of the two shocks. As mentioned above, the central bank will try to stabilize 
any effect following supply shocks, but the central bank cannot control for the monetary 
policy shock. Consequently, in equation (9), the monetary policy shock affects realized 
inflation one to one; a positive monetary policy shock will give higher inflation. A positive 
supply shock, on the other hand, will mean lower realized inflation in period t, since the 
central bank take account of it when conducting monetary policy and need to increase 
inflation less to achieve the desired output above the natural level. Similarly, it is evident 
from equation (11) that both the supply shock and the monetary policy shock will affect the 
realized output in period t, where both a positive supply shock and monetary policy shock will 
lead to increased output. The supply shock will create higher output directly through the 
Lucas supply curve (equation (1)) and the fact that the central bank does not fully neutralize 
the shock. The monetary policy shock will create higher realized inflation, which will mean 
higher real price for the producers who will increase their output. 
                                                 
61 As long as one assumes that  1
𝛾2
< 𝜆, which is a plausible assumption. 
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4.2.2 Rational expectations 
As described above, the central bank succeeds in boosting aggregate output above its natural 
level. The reason is that the general public expects that the central bank will aim for the 
inflation target. But is it likely that the general public will keep on believing in the inflation 
target when a higher inflation rates realized in every period? It does not sound realistic. When 
the general public instead has rational expectations it is assumed to know the loss function of 
the central bank and understand what the optimal policy for the central bank is, i.e. the 
general public knows equation (6) and forms expectations thereafter. With rational 
expectations the general public will know that it is optimal for the central bank to always 
deviate from the communicated target when inflation expectations equal the target, hence 𝜋∗ 
is no longer credible. However, since the general public commits to a wage contract prior to 
the realization of the supply shock, they do not have perfect information about the central 
bank’s choice of money growth.62 The general public solves the following equation when 
forming their expectations:    
𝜋𝑡
𝑒 =  𝐸𝑡−1�∆𝑚𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙� = 11+𝜆𝛾2 𝜋∗ + 𝜆𝛾1+𝜆𝛾2 �𝑦∗ − 𝑦𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙� + 𝜆𝛾21+𝜆𝛾2 𝜋𝑡𝑒 − 𝜆𝛾 1+𝜆𝛾2 𝐸𝑡−1(𝜀𝑡) −  𝐸𝑡−1 (𝑣𝑡)                                                                                                                                           (11)               
                                                                                                            
Given that both the supply shock and the monetary policy shock equals zero on average, 
equation (11) is solved for inflation expectations, 𝜋𝑡𝑒 , to equal:                   𝜋𝑡𝑒 = 𝜋∗ + 𝜆𝛾�𝑦∗ − 𝑦𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙�                                                                                 (12) 
Using equation (12) in equation (6) now yields optimal money growth equal to: 
            ∆𝑚𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 =  𝜋∗ +  𝜆𝛾�𝑦∗ − 𝑦𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙� − 𝜆𝛾1 + 𝜆𝛾2 𝜀𝑡                                              (13) 
which is higher than when expectations where equal to the inflation target. This means that 
when the general public has rational expectations, the central bank must create higher money 
growth to follow the optimal monetary policy, i.e. the one that maximizes social welfare. The 
solutions for actual inflation and output in period t under rational expectations become:  
                                                 
62 Recall the sequential timing described in figure 14. The supply shock, 𝜀𝑡, is observed by the central bank, but 
the monetary policy shock, 𝑣𝑡 , is not. 
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 𝜋𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 =  𝜋∗ +  𝜆𝛾�𝑦∗ − 𝑦𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙� − 𝜆𝛾1+𝜆𝛾2 𝜀𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡    ⟺ 𝜋𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 = 𝜋𝑡𝑒 − 𝜆𝛾1+𝜆𝛾2 𝜀𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡                                                                                                                                                             (14)      𝑦𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 = 𝑦𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 11+𝜆𝛾2 𝜀𝑡 + 𝛾𝑣𝑡                                                                                       (15)       
As when the general public believed that the central bank aimed for the inflation target, it is 
evident from equation (15) that it will be optimal for the central bank still to create inflation 
above the target. Again, the inflation bias is illustrated by the red box. The realized aggregate 
output, on the other hand, will on average equal the natural rate. By simple comparison of 
equations (9), (10), (14) and (15) it is clear that: 
𝜋𝑡
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 > 𝜋𝑡𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒      𝑎𝑛𝑑       𝑦𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 < 𝑦𝑡𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 
When expectations are rational, the central bank creates an even larger inflation bias, without 
being able to boost the output. Why? Because, the general public fully expects the elevated 
inflation and takes account for it when deciding on the wage contracts. From the Lucas supply 
curve (equation (1)) it is evident that when the general public perfectly foresees what the 
realized inflation will be, output will equal the natural rate on average and the result is 
therefore a larger inflation bias, with no effect on output. 
As already mentioned, the timing of the model is essential. Once the general public has 
committed to inflation expectations and wage contracts, the central bank will have an 
incentive to inflate. As soon as the general public expects inflation to be at the target, 𝜋∗, the 
optimal policy for the central bank will be to again create higher inflation and boost the output 
above its natural level, because the central bank re-optimizes monetary policy in every period. 
This is what Kydland and Prescott (1977) call the time-inconsistency problem: What is 
optimal prior to the inflation expectations are formed is no longer optimal after they have 
resulted in wage contracts. As a consequence, the inflation target is not credible, even though 
the central bank and the authorities believe in it, and find it optimal, a priori.  
This section has showed that how the general public forms their inflation expectations matters 
for a possible inflation bias. If the expectations not are rational the central bank may succeed 
in boosting aggregate output above the natural level. If, on the other hand, rational 
expectations exist, the possible inflation bias will have no effect on output. In the next section, 
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I will turn to the empirical analysis of Chinese monetary policy, and search for the existence 
of rational expectations and a possible inflation bias in China. 
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5 Chinese Monetary Policy – An 
Empirical Analysis 
Section 4 clearly showed that under certain circumstances it will be optimal for the central 
bank to create a consistent inflation bias without being able to push aggregate output above its 
natural level. I also argued that the set-up of the Barro Gordon model with monetary policy 
conduction under discretion matched quite well with the Chinese reality, although the model 
of course simplifies the reality in many aspects. In this section, I test this hypothesis by 
empirically search for rational expectations, which are crucial for the outcome of the Barro 
Gordon model, and a possible inflation bias in the Chinese economy. It is not straightforward 
what measure of inflation one should use, and different measures could give different results 
regarding a possible inflation bias. In section 5.1, I therefore present two different inflation 
measures. Section 5.2 discusses how rational Chinese households are when they form their 
inflation expectations, and, consequently, the credibility of the People’s Bank of China 
(PBC). In section 5.3, I make use of available data on Chinese inflation, expectations and 
economic growth to search for a possible inflation bias in the Chinese economy. Finally, 
section 5.4 presents some policy implications and sketches possible steps forward for the PBC 
and the conduction of monetary policy in China. 
5.1 The Chinese inflation rate 
Given the important role inflation plays as a target and goal for the conduction of monetary 
policy, it is crucial which measure that is being used and how this measure is calculated. In 
the discussion of economic transparency in section 3.4, I touched upon the problem of 
reliability of Chinese official statistics. This is of course also highly relevant when discussing 
inflation. Huang et al (2013b) argue that there are two problems concerning the official data 
in China: one technical and one political. The technical aspect reflects the difficulty in 
providing accurate and reliable data on prices and consumption in a fast-growing and 
emerging market with large regional differences. Both the actual price increase and a typical 
consumption basket will vary between provinces. Most importantly, food will take up a larger 
share of a consumption basket in a poor province relative to a richer province. These 
differences are problematic for the construction of a national consumer price index (CPI), 
which should reflect a typical consumption basket.  As a consequence, there are large 
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varieties in the reported inflation rates between provinces and regions. The political aspect of 
lack of reliability in the official statistics reflects the incentives authorities have to report a 
low inflation in line with the target. As argued in section 3.1, high inflation could lead to 
social instability. However, under-reporting inflation would probably have limited effect on 
the stability since it, most likely, is households’ perceived inflation that matters for stability, 
not the reported number. Nonetheless, one should not underestimate the incentives the 
officials have to report inflation statistics in line with the inflation target.63 In sum, Huang et 
al (2013b) conclude that the official CPI may be underestimated by as much as 2 percentage 
points.  
Since 2011, the State Council has reported the annual inflation targets, discussed in section 
3.1.1, in terms of the CPI.64  In this section, I show how the CPI has developed over the 
reform period, further elaborate on how the Chinese CPI is calculated and illustrate the 
problems regarding choosing one basket of goods to represent the consumption patterns of the 
whole economy. Given the problems in measuring inflation in China, I also present an 
additional type of inflation measure, the GDP deflator, as a comparison to the CPI. 
5.1.1 The Consumer price index 
The consumer price index (CPI) reflects the overall price change for a certain basket of goods 
and services bought by households. Like China, most other countries use some kind of CPI 
when measuring the inflation rate.65 Figure 15 below shows the evolution in the CPI since 
1985 and further illustrates that, in a historical perspective, the current level of the CPI is not 
particularly high. Since 1985, there are two clear peaks in the CPI: one in 1989 (28.4 percent); 
and one in 1994 (27.7 percent). In light of this, one could argue that the financial reforms 
since the late 1990s have been successful in stabilizing the inflation rate, and the volatility of 
the CPI has indeed fallen considerably over the period. The variance of the CPI for the period 
                                                 
63 As an example, high income growth has allowed a large share of the middle-class in Beijing to switch from 
public transport to taxies, resulting in a rapid increase in the demand for taxies. Nonetheless, when the taxi fares 
in Beijing finally increased in 2013, it was the first time since 2006. Some sources argue that this is directly 
linked up to the government wanting to avoid a rapid increase in CPI (Economist, 2012 and Chovanec, 2012). If 
true, it illustrates that the government controls prices included in the CPI basket to avoid a too large increase in 
the inflation rate. 
64 Prior to 2011, the State Council used a more vague formulation saying that the consumer prices should not 
increase more than the target, without stating how this change should be measured.  
65 I.e. the ECB targets the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices, Norges Bank targets CPIXE (CPI adjusted for 




1985-2013 is 49.9, while the period 1997-2013 yields a variance of just 6.06. Nonetheless, the 
CPI in China is still much more volatile than in the EU, the US and in Norway where the 
corresponding numbers since 1997 are 0.61, 1.48 and 1.27 respectively.6667 Even though far 
below the peak values from 1989 and 1994, the CPI has showed relatively high values also in 
more recent years, with two peaks: in 2008 (8.5 percent) and 2011 (6.5 percent). 
 
As mentioned above, in a country with such large differences and inequalities the chosen 
commodity basket and the relative weights on the goods will be crucial for the CPI. The 
current Chinese CPI basket consists of commodities divided into eight groups: food; residence 
(rent, water, electricity etc.); tobacco and liquors; clothing; household facilities and services; 
healthcare and personal articles; transportation and communication; and recreation, education 
and culture (Huang et al, 2013b). Notice that housing is not included in the CPI, meaning that 
the rapid price increase in real estate in China in recent years will not show in the CPI 
statistics.68 The relative weights placed on each of the categories in the national CPI are not 
                                                 
66 All calculations are based on monthly year-on-year data from CEIC Data. Statistics on the CPI in the EU is 
only available since 1998. 
67 Conway et al (2010) finds similar results when comparing the Chinese GDP deflator to OECD countries’ GDP 
deflator, and concludes that: “…Chinese inflation remains more volatile than in most OECD countries” (p.41). 
68 It is common practice to not include housing and property prices in the CPI basket. The reason is that buying 
an apartment or a house is more like an investment than actual consumption and as long as the rent prices are 
included in the CPI basket this should incorporate changes in cost of living following changes in prices on 














Figure 15: CPI (monthly year-on-year change) 1985-2013 
CPI (yoy)
Source: CEIC Data 
69 
 
clear since the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) provides little information 
about these.69 What is clear is that food is the most important component, taking up almost 
one third of the whole basket (Funke et al, 2011). The problems of constructing the national 
CPI are further illustrated in figure 16 and 17 below. Figure 16 illustrates the problem of 
placing weight on the different commodities in the national CPI basket. As shown in the 
figure, the price increase in food has been much higher than the national CPI in China.70 From 
the figure it could also seem like changes in prices on food lead the overall price changes 
somewhat.  When removing all food commodities from the CPI basket, the data is much more 
stable, as shown by the non-food CPI in figure 16. The problem for the NBSC is that food 
takes up a much larger share of the typical household’s budget in a poor province, like 
Guizhou, than it does in a typical rich province like Shanghai. By increasing the share of food 
in the national CPI basket it would better represent the typical budget for a household in 
Guizhou, but represent Shanghai’s households worse. Since the NBSC does not provide data 
from the household survey on which they build the CPI basket, it is hard to say whether the 
current basket represents the typical national household’s budget or not. Nonetheless, one 
could conclude from the findings in figure 16 that the more weight placed on food in the CPI 
basket, the more volatile the CPI will be, and the harder it will be for the PBC to reach the 
policy target of stable prices. It must also be noted that food prices in many cases are driven 
by forces that the PBC are unable to control such as weather conditions, floods and droughts, 
and will be more volatile due to these reasons. 
                                                                                                                                                        
proxy on such changes in cost of living. Huang et al (2013b) argues that the current share of residence 
expenditures in the CPI basket (about 18 percent) is too low to fully incorporate changes in cost in residence for 
the Chinese households.  
69 The Chinese CPI is calculated and presented by the NBSC. The NBSC revises the composition of the CPI 
basket every five years, on the basis of surveys made among both urban and rural households. 
70 One of the main components driving up the volatility in food prices are pork prices. In 2007-2008 the pork 
price increased more than 50 percent for 11 months in a row and peaked at 80.9 percent. The average price 




To further illustrate the problem in constructing one national CPI basket, I have divided the 
31 provinces into three groups: The three richest (Tianjin, Beijing and Shanghai) are placed in 
the group labeled “Rich”, the three poorest (Yunnan, Gansu and Guizhou) are placed in the 
group labeled “Poor”, and finally the remaining provinces are all placed in the group labeled 
“Medium rich”.71 In figure 17, I show the average CPI from these three groups. From the 
figure it is evident that there are large differences between the reported CPI in the three 
categories, even though the trends are closely related. Observe especially that the average CPI 
in the poor and medium rich provinces in general lies above the average CPI in the rich 
provinces. During the inflation peak in 2008, the poor and medium rich provinces reported an 
average CPI at 10.6  and 9.3 percent respectively, while the rich provinces only reported an 
average CPI at 7 percent, i.e. more than 3 percentage points in difference. It is also evident 
from the figure that the inflation rates in the poor- and medium rich provinces follow each 
other more closely. I argue that this reflects the fact that even though the category is “medium 
rich” in Chinese standards, the GDP per capita is still quite low, meaning that the medium 
rich provinces in reality are medium poor, and therefore more similar to the poor than the rich 
                                                 
71 I have constructed GDP per capita in all 31 provinces based on the reported provincial GDP and population in 
2011 in National Bureau of Statistics (2012). I have excluded the poorest province, Shaanxi, from the “poor”-
group because the per capita GDP only is one fifth of the next province on the list. This means that the group 
“Medium rich” consists of in total 24 provinces (There is no data available on the CPI in Tibet before 1999, i.e. 













Figure 16: CPI, food and non-food CPI  (monthly year-on-year 
change) 2005-2013 
CPI Non-food CPI Food CPI
Source: CEIC Data 
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provinces.72 The relatively large difference in inflation rates could reflect a larger share of 
food in the CPI basket in the poor- and medium rich provinces than in the rich ones. Notice, 
however, that from the figure it seems like the differences are diminishing, and during the 
inflation peak in 2011 there were only marginal differences in the reported average CPI in the 
three categories. 
  
5.1.2 The GDP deflator 
The last section showed that the CPI data could vary depending on choice of consumption 
basket and the weight placed on the commodities within the basket. Given these problems it is 
interesting to compare the CPI with another inflation measure, the GDP deflator.  
Unlike the CPI, the GDP deflator targets all goods that are produced in China and therefore 
reflects general price changes in the economy. It is measured as the difference between 
nominal and real GDP.73 Figure 18 below shows the evolution in the GDP deflator since 
1987. There is no doubt that it follows the trend in CPI very closely, but since the late 1990s, 
                                                 
72 The average GDP per capita in 2011 in the three groups, measured by international PPP dollars, are 19 882, 8 
928 and 4 468 respectively. 
73 Formally the GDP deflator is calculated as: 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 =  �𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃















Figure 17: The CPI in rich-, medium rich- and poor provinces 
Rich Medium rich Poor
Source: CEIC Data 
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the GDP deflator has been higher than the CPI, and during both inflation peaks in the 2000s 
the GDP deflator peaked at two percentage points higher than the CPI.74  
 
There may be several reasons why the GDP deflator has exceeded the CPI since the beginning 
of the 2000s. The most important reason is most likely China’s entry into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2001, making China a huge new participant in the international trade 
market. While the CPI measures the changes in prices of a fixed basket of goods that Chinese 
consumers typically buy, including some imported goods, the GDP deflator measures price 
changes of all domestically produced goods. As shown in figure 18, some prices on goods 
excluded from the CPI basket have increased more than the prices included in the CPI basket 
and the main suspect is exported goods. Exported goods, are not included in the CPI basket 
but will show in the GDP deflator as long as it is produced domestically. This explains why 
there is a clear shift in the trend around China’s entry into WTO in 2011.75 For example, the 
change in export prices peaked at 11.8 in 2008 compared to 5.9 for the CPI (end of year 
change, CEIC Data). All else equal, the GDP deflator is likely to exceed the CPI if the prices 
                                                 
74 The fact that the GDP deflator has exceeded the CPI in China since 1999 stands in contrast to what is the case 
in the USA, Germany and India where the CPI typically turned out above the GDP deflator. In Norway, 
however, the positive difference between the GDP deflator and the CPI has been even greater than in China. This 
probably reflects the positive development in terms of trade for the Norwegian economy (Martinsen and 
Stensland, 2012).    
75 Export of goods and services as percentage of GDP increased from 20 percent in 1999 to 35 percent in 2008 

































































Figure 18: GDP deflator and CPI (annual end of year change) 1987-
2012 
GDP deflator CPI




on exported goods increase more than the prices on imported goods that are included in the 
CPI basket. A closer look at the actual statistics on exported and imported goods, based on the 
exported price index and imported price index (Macrobond), shows that the prices on 
imported goods have increased more than the prices on exported goods. However, I will still 
argue the validity of my argument, since the imported price index is likely to be driven by 
prices on natural resources and capital which make out the majority of Chinese import. Prices 
on such type of goods are most likely not included in the CPI basket that reflects the 
consumption matter of the households. Consequently it is the prices on final imported goods 
that matter for my argument and I argue that the price increase on this type of goods is likely 
to have been lower. Hence, I argue that it is likely that the GDP deflator exceeds the CPI 
because the prices on exported goods have increased more than the prices on imported goods 
that are included in the CPI basket. 
5.1.3 Choice of inflation measure 
To sum up, it matters for the conduction of monetary policy what measure is used for 
inflation and how it is calculated. This conclusion raises the question why the PBC targets the 
CPI, and not the GDP deflator? The main advantage of the CPI is that it measures the “cost of 
living” for the households and then measures the most relevant prices in the economy. Since it 
measures the prices observed by the general public it also lays a good foundation for the 
household to form their inflation expectations. The disadvantage is that it is impossible for the 
CPI to capture all price changes in the economy and it is crucial how the CPI basket is 
formed. As discussed above, the CPI may change dramatically if the weighting in the basket 
is changed. It is absolutely necessary to create a CPI basket that in the best way possible 
represents the typical budget of a typical household in China for the CPI to be credible and in 
line of the perceived inflation of the agents in the economy. In my view, the lack of 
transparency in the calculation process and the weighting of the commodity basket limit the 
credibility of the CPI as an inflation measure in China. The GDP deflator is a broader 
measure on price changes than the CPI since it captures all price changes on domestically 
produced goods. However, as argued by He and Liu (2011), it is difficult for the households 
to form their inflation expectations on the basis of the GDP deflator since the public often 
have little information and knowledge about the difference in nominal and real GDP. In 
addition, as I argue above, the difference could be driven by prices on exported goods, which 
not affect households too much, while imported goods, which do matter for the households, 
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are excluded. In sum, I find the choice by the State Council to report realized inflation and 
targets in terms of CPI when conducting monetary policy in China reasonable. However, I 
will stress that it is important for the NBSC and the PBC to increase the transparency around 
the calculation process and to pursue a best possible CPI basket that represents a typical 
Chinese household’s budget. 
5.2 Inflation expectations and central bank 
credibility in China 
Blinder (1999) conducts a survey among 127 central banks, where he asks questions on a 
series of issues related to central bank credibility. The results of the survey show that central 
banks regard independence and transparency among the top four determinants of central bank 
credibility. Waller and de Haan (2004) conduct the same type of survey among private sector 
economists, and find the similar result. In sections 3.3 and 3.4, I showed that People’s Bank 
of China (PBC) has several shortcomings both with respect to independence and 
transparency. It is, therefore, reasonable to think that the lack of independence and 
transparency could lead to lower credibility of the PBC. 
Bofinger (2001) defines central bank credibility as “A central bank is generally described as 
credible if its declared policy of pursuing price stability (or, more precisely, the concrete 
numerical value of its inflation target) is taken by private individuals to be the basis of their 
expectation formation” (p.200). In the Barro Gordon model presented in section 4, it is no 
doubt that, due to rational expectations, lack of credibility would lead to an efficiency loss of 
monetary policy as the result will be a too high inflation but output at the natural level.76 The 
more rational the private agents are when forming their expectations, the larger could the loss 
be when the central bank faces limited credibility. In this section, I will make use of the 
definition on central bank credibility in Bofinger (2001) and discuss credibility of the PBC as 
well as to what extent Chinese inflation expectations could be considered rational.  
5.2.1 How rational are Chinese inflation expectations? 
As shown in section 4, the way the private agents form their expectations will be crucial for 
the importance of central bank credibility. If the agents are rational and the central bank 
                                                 
76 See also Box A.1 in the appendix for a discussion of efficiency in the Barro Gordon model.  
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conducts monetary policy as in the Barro Gordon model, they will know that the central bank 
has an incentive to create higher inflation in order to boost output above its natural level, and 
consequently know if the central bank’s inflation target is credible or not. In order to conclude 
on the People’s Bank of China’s (PBC) credibility, I will in this section say something about 
how rational private agents’ inflation expectations are. 
Blanchard et al (2010) define rational expectations as “The formation of expectations based 
on rational forecasts, rather than on simple extrapolations of the past” (p.569). The idea is 
that households, when taking economic decisions, look into the future and try to predict it by 
making use of all available information and knowledge. There is no standard way to measure 
the level of rationality among the agents in an economy. However, it is reasonable to argue 
that it is closely related to the level of education. In the context of monetary policy this means 
that the more educated agents are the better knowledge and information about the process of 
monetary policy conduction and targets they possess, and the more rational expectations 
about future inflation they form. Hence, I find it reasonable to argue that the higher 
educational level, the closer the inflation expectations will be to the realized inflation.77  
Figure 19 below shows the evolution of the number of graduates per year from primary, 
secondary and higher education through the reform period.78  There is a nine-year compulsory 
education in China (primary and junior secondary school), and the completion rate is about 
100 percent (World Bank Data). Hence, the number of graduates from these levels every year 
will in general only follow the demographic population development in China.79  More 
interestingly, figure 19 illustrates that the number of graduates from higher education have 
been increasing rapidly since 2000. In 2012, more than 6,7 million students graduated from 
higher education, more than six times as many as in 2001, and, in 2012, 27 percent of the 
population in the relevant age group were enrolled in higher education. On the other hand, the 
share of the population that holds a higher education degree is still below 10 percent, but this 
share is increasing rapidly. By 2020 the gross enrolment rate in higher education should have 
increased to above 40 percent (Ministry of Education, 2010). 
                                                 
77 This does not necessarily mean that higher education is a necessary condition for rational expectations. A 
person could of course form rational expectations without any educational background.  
78 Under The Culture Revolution (1966-1976) the education system more or less collapsed in China as millions 
of teenagers and students organized into Red Guards and marched to the streets. During 1966-1972 almost all 
institutions providing higher education were closed and many professors and intellectuals were accused of being 
revisionist and sent to the countryside to work in labor camps (See for example Deng and Treiman (1997)).  
79 Even though not compulsory, I assume that the completion rate is close to 100 percent also in the case of 





Given the increasing educational level in China, I argue that the private agents are 
increasingly rational when forming their inflation expectations. I also argue that it becomes 
easier to be rational when forming expectations as a consequence of the increasing availability 
of information in the Chinese society. By the end of 2012, China had more than 560 million 
internet users, meaning that about 40 percent of the population has access to internet as a 
source of information (China Internet Network Information Center, 2013).  As late as in 2005, 
the share was only 8.5 percent. On the other side, the discussion in section 3.4 and 5.1 made it 
clear that access to information still is limited by the lack of transparency of the PBC and the 
official statistics. A higher degree of transparency would without doubt make it easier for all 
agents to make better forecast on inflation expectations. 
5.2.2 Credibility and inflation expectations 
The definition of central bank credibility in Bofinger (2001) closely relates credibility to 
inflation expectations. Taken literally, the definition says that if the central bank is perfectly 
credible and the households are perfectly rational when forming their expectations, all 
inflation expectations should be perfectly anchored. In this section, I will make use of the 
















Figure 19: Number of graduates (annually) from the Chinese 
educational system since 1978 
Primary School Secondary school Higher education
Source: World Bank Data 
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operate under one long-run inflation target, but has changed the target rapidly over the last 
two decades, it is not reasonable to demand stable and well-anchored inflation expectations 
around one constant rate. Instead, I will look at two measures of inflation expectations in 
China: PBC’s household survey and IMF’s consumer price expectations, and argue that the 
households find the PBC credible if the inflation expectations either follow the trend in the 
annual targets, or stay below the target rate.  
THE PBC HOUSEHOLD SURVEY: 
Since 2001, the PBC has published data on households’ inflation expectations. The survey is 
conducted once every quarter on 20 000 depositors in 50 cities. The survey outcome is a 
diffusion index ranging from 0 to 100 where a reading above 50 indicates positive price 
expectations on average among the depositors. Figure 20 below illustrates the evolution in the 
price expectations since 2001 together with the annual inflation targets. First, notice that there 
has been an increasing trend in the annual inflation targets from 2001 (1.2 percent) to 2012 (4 
percent). If the inflation target is credible it should be a corresponding increasing trend in 
inflation expectations. From figure 20 such increasing trend is indeed evident. This could 
mean that the depositors find the central bank’s annual inflation target credible, which further 
strengthens the hypothesis of rational inflation expectations in the Chinese economy. On the 
other hand, the inflation expectations cannot be considered to be anchored around one stable 
level, but as long as the target itself changes so rapidly it is only natural that also the 
expectations change. Furthermore, expectations tend to lead the change in the inflation target, 
which could indicate that the Chinese households possess good knowledge about how the 
State Council and the PBC set the annual inflation target. It is of course also possible that the 





It is of course a weakness of the survey that it does not correspond to an expected percentage 
change in the CPI. This makes it hard to compare these inflation expectations with both 
realized inflation and annual targets. The PBC does not provide information about the actual 
questions asked in the survey, so it is hard to say how long into the future the depositors are 
asked to forecast inflation. However, some sources indicate that the depositors are asked 
about the inflation expectations for the next quarter (see for example PBC, 2012). 
Consequently, in figure 21 below, I compare the results from the PBC’s survey to realized 
inflation 4 months later. As evident from the figure, the inflation expectations correspond 
remarkably well with actual trends in price changes.80 This result shows that although the CPI 
is very volatile, the Chinese households seem to be successful in forecasting the actual 
development in domestic prices.81 The fact that the Chinese households seems to be able to 
both forecast future changes in the inflation target as well as the actual price changes further 
strengthens the view of the Chinese private agents being rational when forming expectations. 
                                                 
80 The correlation coefficient over the period equals 0,8. 
81 In order to land on this conclusion one must assume that the depositors included in the survey represent a 
representative sample of the whole population. The little information available about the sample indicates that 
the depositors all are urban, meaning that the survey only represents about half of the Chinese population. Also, I 



























Figure 20 The PBC's household price expectation survey (quarterly) 
and the inflation target  
Future price expectations (LHS) Inflation target (RHS)
Source: CEIC Data, Central People’s Government of the People’s 





IMF CONSUMER PRICE EXPECTATIONS: 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) publishes forecasts on changes in consumer prices in 
the World Economic Outlook (WEO). The IMF must be regarded rational when forming 
inflation expectations. Therefore, comparing the IMF expectations with PBC’s annual targets 
should provide information about the credibility of the central bank. In figures 22a and 22b 
below, I have combined IMF’s projections with PBC’s annual inflation targets and realized 
CPI. As is evident from the figure, the IMF inflation expectations for same year inflation are 
lower than the PBC annual targets.82 As emphasized in section 3.1.1, the annual PBC targets 
must be considered as maximum levels for inflation, leading to the conclusion that the IMF 
finds the PBC credible. Furthermore, the last year inflation expectation follows the same 
pattern.83 However, it is impossible that these projections are based on the PBC’s annual 
targets, because these targets are not yet published at the time the IMF presents their 
projections. On one hand, this strengthens the view of the IMF as rational when forming their 
expectations, and to some extent manages to predict how the State Council changes the target. 
                                                 
82 The IMF WEO is published in April and October every year with forecasts on the average price change in 
consumer prices for the whole year and the next. In figure 22, the April versions from the years 2001-2013 are 
used.   





























Figure 21: The PBC's household price expectation survey, the 
inflaiton target and CPI (quarterly) 
Price expectations (one quarter lag) Inflation target (RHS)
CPI quarterly yoy (RHS)
Source: CEIC Data, Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Central 
People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China (2000-2013) and Geiger (2010) 
80 
 
On the other hand, it could be problematic for the credibility of the PBC if it means that the 
State Council sets the annual inflation targets in such way that it only follows the general 
development in the economy, and not tries to find the socially optimal inflation level. 
Nonetheless, the fact that the IMF projections for future inflation and the annual targets 
coincide in the way such as evident from figures 22b, indicates that the market is good at 
forecasting the future development in the inflation targets. It is also evident from the two 
figures that the IMF succeeds in forecasting the development in actual CPI rather well, 
although less accurate one year ahead.  
  
 
Based on the two measures of inflation expectations discussed above and the definition in 
Bofinger (2001) on central bank credibility, I have to conclude that the expectations seems 
rational and that the PBC’s credibility seems quite high. However, both the PBC’s household 
survey on price expectations and the IMF projections one year ahead opens for the possibility 
that the annual targets are sat in a way that matches the markets expectations, and not the 
other way around. Or perhaps more likely; the annual inflation target is changed to match the 
development in the economy. If this is the case, the PBC’s annual inflation targets should 
rather be understood as the government’s price expectations and not a target for the price 
change.  
Source: IMF (2001-2013), Central People’s Government of the Perople’s Republic of 





































Figure  22a: IMF same year inflation 










































Figure 22b: IMF last year inflation 








5.3 Does China have an inflation bias? 
In section 4, I showed, by the use of the Barro Gordon model, that when a central bank 
conducts monetary policy under discretion and targets an output level above the natural rate, a 
positive inflation bias will evolve. In addition, if the private agents have rational expectations, 
as I have argued that the Chinese private agents do, the inflation bias will be even larger and 
there will be no effect on aggregate output. Section 5.2 gave room for a possible positive 
inflation bias as the People’s Bank of China (PBC) is credible and there are rational inflation 
expectations. In this section, I will make use of both the official Chinese data on inflation and 
the market’s inflation expectations to search for an inflation bias. However, it will not be 
possible to conclude on the basis of the data available, partly because of the possible incorrect 
reporting of official data, discussed in section 5.1, but more importantly because inflation 
could be different from the target because of external shocks, as explained in section 4. As a 
consequence, based on the information about the Chinese monetary policy provided in this 
thesis, I will in the following summarize the arguments both in favor of and against the 
possibility of an inflation bias in China.  
In section 4, I defined the positive inflation bias as the difference between realized inflation 
and the socially optimal inflation target, excluding any effects from shocks. As noted several 
times, China lacks an explicit long run inflation target. Instead the State Council sets the 
target for inflation annually. Assuming that these annual targets equal the socially optimal 
inflation level at each point in time, I have calculated the possible inflation bias as the 
difference between realized inflation and targeted inflation, see table 9. A positive (negative) 
number in the column labeled “bias” indicates that realized inflation turned out to be greater 
(smaller) than the annual target. 
Table 9: Inflation bias 
Year Target 
(%) 
Realized (%) Bias  (realized – target)  
1996 10 8,3 -1,7 
1997 6 2,8 -3,2 
1998 5 -0,8 -5,8 
1999 2 -1,4 -3,4 
2000 1 0,3 -0,7 
2001 1-2 0,7 -0,8*  
2002 1-2 -0,8 -2,3* 
2003 1 1,2 0,2 
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2004 3 3,9 0,9 
2005 4 1,8 -2,2 
2006 3 1,5 -1,5 
2007 3 4,8 1,8 
2008 4,8 5,9 1,1 
2009 4 -0,7 -4,7 
2010 3 3,3 0,3 
2011 4 5,4 1,4 
2012 4 2,7 -1,3 
Source: World Bank Data, Central People’s Government of the People’s 
Republic of China (2000-2013) and Geiger (2010) 
* The difference between realized and target inflation for 2001 and 2002 is measured 
using 1,5 percent as inflation target. 
 
The difference between realized and targeted inflation is further illustrated in figure 23 below. 
The figure also displays deviations in realized output from the output target.84 It is evident 
that since 1996 the Chinese CPI has been above the maximum inflation target for just 35 
percent of the time.85 Considering economic growth targets, on the other hand, the 
government has missed the minimum growth targets only twice since 1996: In year 1998 and 
1999. Using the terminology from the Barro Gordon model in section 4, these results indicate 
a high value of 𝜆, the relative weight placed on aggregate output in the central bank loss 
function (see equation (3) in section 4.1). A higher relative weight placed on output would 
increase the size of the inflation bias if present, but also inflation volatility relative to output 
volatility. The variance in realized inflation is 41.3, compared to 3.4 for the realized output, 
indicating a higher 𝜆.86 Although these volatility calculations indicate a higher relative weight 
placed on output, I will argue that 35 percent is a too low share to conclude that a positive 
inflation bias is present in the Chinese economy.  
                                                 
84 See section 3.1.1 and table 3 for more on the economic growth target. 
85 In a worst-case scenario, the official CPI data is underestimated by as much as two percentage points, 
according to Huang et al (2013b). When adding two percentage points to the realized inflation in table 10, 
realized inflation instead exceeds the annual targets 65 percent of the time since 1996, and as much as 77 percent 
since 2000.   
86 These calculations are based on end-of-year inflation compared to a year before and annual percentage growth 
in GDP (World Bank).  
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Source: World Bank Data, Central People’s Government of the People’s 
Republic of China (2000-2013) and Geiger (2010) 
 
 
To further search for a possible inflation bias in the Chinese economy, I make use of the 
Citigroup Inflation Surprise Index. This index measures monthly realized inflation against the 
consensus of the market expectations. A positive number means that actual inflation turned 
out to be larger than what the market expected. If the market perfectly forecasts actual 
inflation, the index will show a value of zero. If the index shows a negative number, the 
realized inflation turned out below expectations. Figure 24 below shows the surprise inflation 
index for China, and as a comparison the euro area, since 2001. At first glance, it may seem 
like the market is doing a poor job in forecasting inflation expectations and the figure 
illustrates a very volatile index. However, by comparing it to the inflation surprise index for 
the euro area there are similar trends, with the index for the euro area almost as volatile as the 



















Figure 23: The possible inflation and output bias 




The foundation for the inflation bias is the central bank’s desire to boost output above the 
natural level by creating surprise inflation above the household’s expectations. I argue that, if 
assuming that the PBC tries to create surprise inflation above expectations, whether or not 
they succeed would be evident from the surprise index. If no positive inflation is present, one 
should, on average, expect that the index turns out negative (positive) about fifty percent of 
the time. Hence, if the index turns out positive for a large share of the time, it indicates that 
the PBC succeeds in surprising the market. Table 10 summarizes the share of the time since 
2001 that the surprise index has turned out positive for five different countries/group of 
countries. As is evident from the table, China’s surprise inflation index has been positive 45 
percent of the time since 2001. This is below the same share in both the EU and Norway, and 
only marginally above the one in the US. I argue that the Chinese share is too low to conclude 
that the PBC creates surprise inflation. Quite the contrary, I argue that this is only what one 
should expect: In the long run, the market fails to predict realized inflation upwards 
(downwards) about fifty percent of the time.  
Table 10: Surprise Inflation Index 
Country China EU USA Norway Emerging Markets 
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So does China have an inflation bias? Based on the calculations above, I argue that one 
cannot conclude that there is an inflation bias in China. Nonetheless, the simple calculations 
and illustrations do not fully reject the possibility for a bias. In addition, several aspects of the 
setup and conduction of Chinese monetary policy further strengthen the possibility of an 
inflation bias. First, I argue that the PBC target for the output level exceeds the natural level, 
which is a necessary condition for an inflation bias to evolve. There is no doubt that the 
currency has been under-valued in the past, which has created high foreign demand for 
Chinese goods and large current account surpluses. This development has created distortions 
and contributed to high economic growth. The annual growth targets are sat in this economic 
environment, and therefore most likely exceed the natural level for output growth that would 
evolve if the exchange rate had fluctuated freely. Second, there are incentives for the 
responsible authorities to put high relative weight on output. As argued in section 3.1, 
Chinese leaders at all levels and in all institutions are first of all measured by their ability to 
contribute to further economic growth. Third, the PBC cannot be regarded as an independent 
central bank. There are many empirical results showing a negative relationship between the 
level of independence and inflation, although none considering China in particular. 
Nonetheless, it is very much likely that the many other institutions and individuals that matter 
for the conduction of monetary policy in China place higher weight on output, or target an 
even higher output than the PBC. If so, it increases the possibility that an inflation bias will 
evolve. Fourth, the narrow and state-dominated financial sector, described in section 2.3, 
gives incentives for high credit growth and, consequently, an expansive monetary policy. 
Finally, the lack of transparency around the conduction of monetary policy could mean that it 
is easier for the PBC to create surprise inflation.  
Given the arguments summarized above, it may seem like a puzzle why my calculations do 
not show any actual evidence of an inflation bias. However, this thesis has also presented 
several arguments for why an inflation bias is unlikely to evolve in China. First, and most 
importantly, high inflation is politically sensitive in China. Ultimately, high inflation could 
lead to unrest and social instability and there is no doubt that this increases the relative weight 
placed on inflation in the central bank loss function. Second, a central bank without 
independence does not in itself mean that an inflation bias will evolve. Bofinger (2001) states 
that “… In countries with low unemployment, a high preferences for price stability among the 
population, and a very stable political environment, an inflation bias is not very likely even 
with a completely dependent central bank” (p.220). The political environment must be said to 
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be rather stable in China, and the Communist Party need not to worry about being re-elected.  
Third, despite the lack of transparency, the discussion in section 5.2, and  the calculation 
above related to the Citigroup Inflation Surprise Index, showed that the Chinese households 
are quite good at forecasting future inflation and are increasingly rational when forming their 
inflation expectations, meaning that creating an elevated inflation would be less preferable for 
the PBC.  
Based on the argumentation above, I conclude that there is no consistent inflation bias present 
in China. However, even if an inflation bias is not present, it seems evident that more weight 
is put on stabilizing output than inflation, resulting in higher inflation volatility. In the next 
section, I will present several steps that may be taken to create a more stable inflation and 
prevent a possible inflation bias to evolve in the future. 
5.4 Policy implications: How to create stable 
inflation in China and steps forward for monetary 
policy 
Section 5.3 showed that realized inflation has exceeded the annual maximum targets for 35 
percent of the time since 1996, and perhaps more if one takes the underreported CPI into 
account. In addition, inflation has been much more volatile than output, indicating an high 
weight placed on reaching the policy goal of output relative to reaching the policy goal of 
price stability. High and volatile inflation makes it harder for the general public to form their 
inflation expectations and, consequently, creates an uncertain economic environment. 
However, one may ask the question whether it is fair to require a stable and low inflation in 
China? After all, China is an emerging market and the economy is still growing at high levels. 
Consequently, the prices must increase as the economy develops. In Caixin (2012), Governor 
Zhou Xiaochuan of the PBC considers this issue and states that: “…, if the central bank 
overly emphasized the low inflation objective, this might hinder the government’s price 
reform… monetary policy should leave room for price hikes caused by reform which helps 
optimize resource allocation (p.3). Nonetheless, price stability is considered a policy goal of 
the monetary policy in the law on PBC and the State Council sets explicit maximum levels for 
price changes. In section 5.3, I showed that there are several aspects of the setup and 
conduction of monetary policy in China that build up under a highly volatile inflation and the 
possibility that an inflation bias could evolve. In this section, I present some steps that may be 
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taken by the government to avoid that an inflation bias evolves and at the same time reduce 
inflation volatility.  
The most important step forward for monetary policy is, in my view, to replace the constantly 
shifting annual inflation target by a medium- or long term constant target rate. This would 
solve any inflation bias problem entirely, as showed by Svensson (1995).87 At the same time 
it would make the Chinese monetary policy more predictable and remove the possibility that 
the targets are adjusted just to match the expected development in the economy, as discussed 
in section 5.2. It is important that such target is flexible, to incorporate the current two-fold 
policy goal of monetary policy; price stability and economic growth. This means that the PBC 
will still care about stabilizing output around some level, although the weight placed on 
output should be reduced. The cost of this will be a somewhat higher volatility in output 
growth. On the other side, the gain will be a much more stable inflation in the long-run, which 
in itself could lead to higher growth as it makes it easier for the general public to form their 
expectations about future inflation. In addition, a new mandate of a flexible inflation target, if 
communicated the right way, would in itself increase transparency, as it is hard to interpret 
the current mandate of the PBC.  
In sum, I argue that combining a credible and flexible inflation target with a transparent 
monetary policy would help the PBC control household’s inflation expectations. In addition, I 
argue that by granting a new mandate for monetary policy to the PBC, several of the other 
problematic issues will also be solved. First, in order for the PBC to credibly follow a long-
run inflation target, it is crucial that it freely can adjust the monetary policy instruments. This 
means that the instrumental independence of the PBC must increase. On the other side, it does 
not mean that the goal independence needs to increase. It is perfectly possible that a new 
flexible inflation target is decided by the State Council, as long as it is time-consistent and has 
a medium- or long-term perspective. Second, if the PBC is granted a new mandate to control 
prices in the long-run around an explicit target, it will no longer be possible for other 
institutions, such as the National Development and Reform Commission, to directly control 
important prices in the economy. And similarly, it will not be possible to conduct an 
expansive monetary policy so that the large state-owned banks could continue to fuel the 
economy with cheap credit. Third, if the inflation target manages to anchor the medium-term 
inflation expectations, it could mean that China over time could move closer to a fully 
                                                 
87 See the appendix for further discussion of this, and other, solutions to the inflation bias problem. 
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floating exchange rate, which again would help the economy re-balance from an export and 
investment driven economy towards a more equally balance between the GDP components. 
Finally, in a longer perspective, I argue that the PBC will find it easier to control prices by 
market-based instruments, such as the interest rate. This would of course, require that the 
current ceiling on commercial banks’ deposit rates is removed. 
89 
 
6 Concluding remarks 
The content of this thesis is two-fold. First, I give an overview of the setup and conduction of 
monetary policy in China, and second, by the use of an empirical analysis, I search for a 
positive inflation bias in the Chinese economy. In the Barro Gordon model, a positive 
inflation bias, combined with rational expectations, will result in higher inflation without any 
effect on aggregate output. By the use of the Barro Gordon model, I find that, in theory, such 
inflation bias could likely evolve in China as many of the necessary conditions for an inflation 
bias to evolve is fulfilled. Formally, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) is the responsible 
institution for conducting monetary policy in China. However, the PBC’s power is limited by 
the lack of independence of the State Council and the China Communist Party (CCP), and I 
argue that the CCP is the final decision-making authority in all important cases related to 
monetary policy. In addition, the PBC is hurt by the lack of transparency that surrounds the 
setup and conduction of monetary policy. There is a high degree of uncertainty regarding the 
actual mandate of the PBC and how monetary policy is conducted. The lack of independence 
and transparency could hurt the PBC’s credibility and consequently make it harder for the 
PBC to control the private agents’ inflation expectations. The legacy from the planned-
economy is still strong, with a deep, but narrow financial market dominated by state-owned 
enterprises with close ties to the decision-making authorities. Combined with an undervalued 
currency, I argue that it is likely that the output level targeted by the PBC exceed its natural 
level.  
However, although the institutional foundation for monetary policy and my theoretical 
analysis suggest that a positive inflation bias may exist in China, my empirical analysis lacks 
evidence of bias. Realized inflation exceeded target about one third of the time since 1996, 
and I argue that this is a too little share to conclude that an inflation bias is present. However, 
the inflation rate has been highly volatile, both compared to inflation in other economies and 
to domestic economic growth. This result indicates that the PBC places a majority of the 
weight on output when conducting monetary policy. I argue that it seems like the PBC is 
willing to accept a more volatile inflation in change of a more stable and higher economic 
growth, as long as the inflation stays below reasonable levels that secure continued social 
stability. Although the conduction of monetary policy in China has come a long way since the 
reform-period started, I argue that several steps remain to be taken. Most importantly, I argue 
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that the State Council should replace the constantly shifting annual inflation target by a 
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A.1 Solutions to the inflation bias 
The Barro Gordon model, discussed in section 4, showed that when the central bank conducts 
monetary policy under discretion, an inflation bias will evolve, and, if the general public has 
rational expectations, the elevated inflation has no effect on aggregate output. Clearly this 
cannot be optimal. Several possible solutions to the inflation bias problem have been 
suggested in the literature. In this appendix, I present three of these possible solutions. 
A.1.1 Commitment to a rule 
One possible solution to the inflation bias problem is to let the central bank commit to a 
policy rule prior to the inflation expectations are formed. This theory builds on Kydland and 
Prescott (1977), and, as this section will show, commitment to a rule will remove the inflation 
bias entirely without harming the aggregate output. Formally, I assume that the central bank 
commits to a rule of the type:           ∆𝑚𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝜀𝑡                                                                                                             (A. 1) 
A policy rule of the type in equation (A.1) will allow the central bank to conduct stabilizing 
policy, i.e. react to the supply shock. The general public will believe in this rule, and form the 
inflation expectations thereafter, as long as the commitment to this rule is credible. If the rule 
is credible, inflation expectations will equal:             𝐸𝑡−1(∆𝑚𝑡) = 𝜋𝑡𝑒 = 𝑏0,                                                                                      (A. 2)              
since the supply shock equal zero in expectations. By inserting for equation (A.1) and (A.2) in 
the central bank loss function, equation (3), the minimization problem for the central bank 
becomes: 
𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑏0,𝑏1 𝐿𝑡 =  12 [(𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝜀𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡 − 𝜋∗)2 + 𝜆{𝑦𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 + (1 + 𝛾𝑏1)𝜀𝑡 − 𝑦∗ + 𝛾𝑣𝑡}2] (A. 3)   
Since the central bank commits to the rule prior to the general public forms the inflation 
expectations, 𝑏0 and 𝑏1 are chosen to minimize the unconditional expectation of the loss 
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function. The unconditional expectation of the loss function is found by taking the expectation 
of equation (19): 
𝐸𝑡−1(𝐿𝑡) = 12 [(𝑏0 − 𝜋∗)2 + 𝑏12𝜎𝜀2 + 𝜎𝑣2]+ 𝜆 12 ��𝑦𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 − 𝑦∗�2 + (1 + 𝛾𝑏1)2𝜎𝜀2 + 𝛾2𝜎𝑣2�     (A. 4) 
Where 𝜎𝜀2 and 𝜎𝑣2 are the variance of the supply and monetary policy shock respectively.
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The first order conditions to this minimization problem, solved for 𝑏0 and 𝑏1, equals: 
𝑏0 =  𝜋∗   𝑎𝑛𝑑     𝑏1 = − 𝜆𝛾1 + 𝜆𝛾2 
Inserting the optimal values of 𝑏0 and 𝑏1 into the policy rule, equation (A.1), yields the new 
optimal money growth for central bank:  
∆𝑚𝑡 =  𝜋∗ − 𝜆𝛾1 + 𝜆𝛾2 𝜀𝑡                                                                                   (A. 5) 
The realized inflation and output under commitment to the policy rule are found by inserting 
for equation (A.5) in equations (1) and (2) when using equation (A.2): 
         𝜋𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 =  𝜋∗ − 𝜆𝛾1 + 𝜆𝛾2 𝜀𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡       <  𝜋𝑡𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 < 𝜋𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙        (A. 6)     
𝑦𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 =  𝑦𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 11 + 𝜆𝛾2 𝜀𝑡 + 𝛾𝑣𝑡 =  𝑦𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 < 𝑦𝑡𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒     (A. 7) 
As is evident from equation (A.6), under commitment to a policy rule, the inflation bias will 
disappear and, as evident from equation (A.7), aggregate output will be equal to its natural 
level in the absence of shocks. Since inflation is reduced without harming aggregate output, 
commitment to a policy rule is superior to discretion under rational expectations, as shown 
formally in Box A.1. It is, however, crucial that the general public finds the policy rule, and 




                                                 





𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑒� =  12 � 𝜆1 + 𝜆𝛾2 ��𝑦∗ − 𝑦𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙�2 + 𝜎𝜀2� + (1 + 𝜆𝛾2)𝜎𝑣2�       (A. 8) 
𝐸𝑡−1�𝐿
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙� =  12 �𝜆(1 + 𝜆𝛾2) ��𝑦∗ − 𝑦𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙�2 + 𝜎𝑣2� + 𝜆1 + 𝜆𝛾2 𝜎𝜀2�    (A. 9) 
𝐸𝑡−1�𝐿
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡� =  12 �𝜆�𝑦∗ − 𝑦𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙�2 + 𝜆1 + 𝜆𝛾2 𝜎𝜀2 + (1 + 𝜆𝛾2)𝜎𝑣2�  (A. 10) 
𝐿𝑡
𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 < 𝐿𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒 < 𝐿𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 
Box A.1 The welfare losses: Discretion vs. Rules  
What way of conducting monetary policy is preferable for the society? That is, what 
regime maximizes social welfare? In this model, the most preferable monetary policy is 
the one that minimizes the losses for the central bank. If the general public’s inflation 
expectations equal the inflation target, 𝜋∗, as discussed in section 4.2.1, the expected loss 
is found by inserting equation (10) and (11) into equation (3) and taking the expectations, 
the expected loss is then: 
Where 𝜎𝜀2 and 𝜎𝑣2 are the variances of the supply shock and monetary policy shock. 
Similarly, the expected loss under discretion with rational expectations, as discussed in 
section 4.2.2, and under commitment to a policy rule equals: 
Simple comparison of equations (A.8), (A.9) and (A.10) show that: 
This means that discretion is superior to commitment as long as the general public not has 
rational expectations. The reason is that under surprise inflation the central bank succeeds 
in boosting output above its natural level, at a low cost in terms of higher inflation. If, on 
the other side, the general public have rational expectations, it is preferable for the society 





A.1.2 Delegating the conduction of monetary policy 
Another solution to the inflation bias problem, related to central bank independence, is to 
delegate the conduction of monetary policy to an independent and conservative central 
banker, first suggested by Rogoff (1985). As mentioned above, the inflation bias is increasing 
in the relative weight the central bank puts on output, 𝜆. Rogoff (1985) suggests that the size 
of the inflation bias and the cost of it may be reduced by appointing a central banker that puts 
lower weight on output relative to inflation when conducting monetary policy. A conservative 
central banker is then one with some 𝛿 > 0 such that89: 
𝜆𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠. = 𝜆 − 𝛿 < 𝜆                                                                                                     (A. 12)                                
The corresponding loss function for the conservative central banker then becomes: 
𝐿𝑡 =  12 [(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋∗)2 +  𝜆𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠.(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦∗)2]                                                                                   (A. 13) 
And the realized inflation and output in period t with rational expectations and a conservative 
central banker equals: 
                                                 
89 Notice that another possible solution is to hire a conservative central banker that targets 𝑦𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙  rather than 
the social optimal 𝑦∗ in the loss function. This would remove the inflation bias entirely.  
𝐸𝑡−1�𝐿
𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡_𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒� =  12 �𝜆�𝑦∗ − 𝑦𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙�2 + 𝜆𝜎𝜀2 + (1 + 𝜆𝛾2)𝜎𝑣2�  (A. 11) 
The policy rule described above must be characterized as a flexible policy rule in the sense 
that it allows the central bank to react to supply shocks. If, on the other side, the policy rule 
was strict, i.e.  ∆𝑚𝑡 =  𝜋∗, the expected loss would equal: 
From equation (A.11) it is evident that the central bank, and the society, would be hurt by 
loss of flexibility and the commitment to a policy rule would only be superior to discretion 
(with rational expectations) if the volatility of the supply shock is small enough or if  
𝑦∗ − 𝑦𝑡
𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 is large enough. However, if the volatility of the supply shock is small 
enough, a policy rule that removes all flexibility for the central bank could be preferable 
for the society, since the inflation bias is removed. The cost of a policy rule of this type is 




𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 =  𝜋∗ +  𝜆𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠.𝛾�𝑦∗ − 𝑦𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙� − 𝜆𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠.𝛾1 + 𝜆𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠.𝛾2 𝜀𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡                                (A. 14) 
𝑦𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑒 = 𝑦𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 11 + 𝜆𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠.𝛾2 𝜀𝑡 + 𝛾𝑣𝑡                                             (A. 15) 
Since 𝜆𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 < 𝜆, the size of the inflation bias has been reduced compared to the 
scenario described in 4.2.2. The size of the inflation bias goes towards zero as 𝛿 goes towards 
𝜆, i.e. when the monetary policy goes towards strict inflation targeting. However, from 
equation (A.15) it is evident that under a conservative central banker the central bank will 
react less to supply shocks leading to a more volatile output. Hence, appointing a super-
conservative central banker will be inferior to a flexible policy rule of the type described 
above. There is a trade-off between reducing the inflation bias and remaining ability to 
stabilize output. This means that there exist some optimal level of conservatism, i.e. an 
optimal value of the relative weight placed on output, 𝜆𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠., within the range [0, 𝜆]. 
Bofinger (2001) argues that the main gain from delegating the conduction of monetary policy 
to an independent and conservative central bank is to assure a longer time-horizon. The 
government may have a too short time-horizon due to election or other interests. By 
delegating the conduction of monetary policy, one secures that the weight put on output does 
not increase when an election is approaching. 
A.1.3 Changing the inflation target 
The third, and final, possible solution to the inflation bias problem I will consider in this 
appendix is to assign the central bank with an explicit, conservative, inflation target, first 
suggested by Svensson (1995). By setting a lower and more conservative target for inflation, 
the inflation bias will be reduced. I call the new inflation target 𝜋𝑔𝑜𝑣 which is assumed to be 
less than the social optimal 𝜋∗. The central bank loss function then becomes:  
𝐿𝑡 =  12 [(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑔𝑜𝑣)2 +  𝜆(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦∗)2]                                                                             (A. 16) 
The realized inflation and output in period t with rational expectations equal: 
𝜋𝑡
𝑔𝑜𝑣 = 𝜋𝑔𝑜𝑣 + 𝜆𝛾�𝑦∗ − 𝑦𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙� − 𝜆𝛾1 + 𝜆𝛾2 𝜀𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡                                                       (A. 17) 
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𝑦𝑡
𝑔𝑜𝑣 = 𝑦𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 11+𝜆𝛾2 𝜀𝑡 + 𝛾𝑣𝑡                                                                        (A. 18) 
Then it is clear that the inflation bias will be entirely removed if the conservative inflation 
target is chosen so as to fulfill: 
𝜋𝑔𝑜𝑣 = 𝜋∗ − 𝜆𝛾�𝑦∗ − 𝑦𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙�                                                                                                  (A. 19) 
It is also evident from equation (A.18) that by delegating a more conservative inflation target 
to the central bank the inflation bias is removed without affecting the average aggregate 
output in the economy. Contrary to the case with conservative preferences, discussed above, 
the ability for the central bank to stabilize any supply shock is not affected either. It is obvious 
from equation (35) that the conservative inflation target must be sat lower the larger the 
inflation bias is, and the inflation bias is, as already mentioned, increasing in 𝜆, 𝛾, and 
�𝑦∗ − 𝑦𝑡
𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙�. By setting the inflation target as shown in equation (A.19) the total loss for 
the society will equal: 
             𝐸𝑡−1(𝐿𝑔𝑜𝑣) =  12 �𝜆�𝑦∗ − 𝑦𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙�2 + 𝜆1 + 𝜆𝛾2 𝜎𝜀2 + (1 + 𝜆𝛾2)𝜎𝑣2�                   (A. 20) 
By comparing equation (A.20) with equation (A.9) presented in Box A.1, it is evident that a 
monetary policy regime that targets a conservative inflation target, 𝜋𝑔𝑜𝑣, is superior to one 
where the social optimal inflation is the target for the central bank. 
A.2 List of abbreviations 
ABC  Agriculture Bank of China  
AMC  Asset Management Companies 
BOC  Bank of China 
BOCOM Bank of Communications 
BoE  Bank of England 
CBRC  China Banking Regulatory Commission 
CCB  China Construction Bank 
CCP  Chinese Communist Party 
CGFE  The Central Group for Finance and Economics 
CIC  China Investment Corporation 
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CIRC  China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
CSRC  China Securities Regulatory Commission 
CPI  Consumer Price Index 
ECB  European Central Bank 
FED  Federal Reserve Bank 
FMD  Financial Market Department 
FSB  Financial Stability Bureau 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
ICBC  Industrial Commercial Bank of China 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
MOF  Ministry of Finance 
MPC  Monetary Policy Committee 
MPD  Monetary Policy Department 
NBSC  National Bureau of Statistics 
NDRC  National Development and Reform Commission 
NPC  National People’s Congress 
NPLs  Non-Performing Loans 
OMOs  Open Market Operations 
PBC  People’s Bank of China 
PPI  Producer Price Index 
PRC  People’s Republic of China 
QFII  Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor 
RMB  Renminbi 
RRR  Reserve Requirements Ratio 
SAFE  State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
SASAC State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission 
SOE  State-owned Enterprise 
TIC  Trust and Investment Companies 
TSF  Total Social Financing 
USD  United States Dollar 
WEO  World Economic Outlook 
WTO  World Trade Organization 
